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HEALTH CARE REFORM & ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT—A 
CURE FOR HEALTH PLAN MERGER MARKET DEFINITION 
UNDER A POST-HEALTH CARE REFORM REGIME 
INTRODUCTION 
With President Barack Obama’s recent appointments of Jonathan D. 
Leibowitz as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Christine 
A. Varney as the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust for the Department 
of Justice (DOJ), there is much to be said about what the future of antitrust 
enforcement will look like.1  Leibowitz and Varney together have set a tone of 
aggressive and vigilant antitrust enforcement almost immediately.2  
Undoubtedly, this is an exciting time in antitrust enforcement—at the time of 
this writing, health reform recently passed, and both federal agencies that 
enforce the U.S. antitrust laws are now uniquely poised to rethink the bedrock 
upon which longstanding merger analysis has rested for over fifteen years.3 
On October 22, 2009, FTC Chairman Leibowitz announced that the 
Antitrust Division of the DOJ as well as the FTC (collectively, “the Agencies”) 
would be conducting a series of five workshops focusing on possibly revising 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Guidelines”) used by the Agencies to 
evaluate potentially anticompetitive mergers.4  This development was 
 
 1. See Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era, Remarks as Prepared for the Center for 
American Progress 19 (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/ 
245711.pdf (“The current economic challenges raise unique issues for antitrust authorities and 
private sectors.  We are faced with market conditions that force us to engage in a critical analysis 
of previous enforcement approaches.  That analysis makes clear that passive monitoring of 
market participants is not an option.  Antitrust must be among the frontline issues in the 
Government’s broader response to the distressed economy.”) (emphasis added); see also Jon 
Leibowitz, Chairman, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/commissioners/leibowitz/in 
dex.shtml (last visited June 20, 2011). 
 2. See, e.g., Varney, supra note 1, at 5. 
 3. Andrea Agathoklis, In Their Own Words: Predicting Enforcement Under Varney and 
Leibowitz, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 5, 6. 
 4. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES (1992) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf; see also Varney, supra note 1, 
at 16.  At the time of this writing, all five workshops have been completed.  For a discussion of 
which topics were discussed at each workshop, see Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Updating the Merger Guidelines: Issues for the 
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welcomed by many practitioners and academics, as the Guidelines have not 
seen substantial revisions in roughly eighteen years.5  This is not to say that the 
Guidelines have become wholly anachronistic, as they have clearly passed the 
test of time and are still broadly validated among courts and antitrust 
practitioners.6  Yet, although the Guidelines have proven quite durable, the 
Agencies make it unmistakably clear—stamping it on the front page of their 
DOJ & FTC Questions for Public Comment—that the workshops’ two primary 
goals are determining whether the Guidelines “accurately and clearly describe 
current [merger review] practices,” and incorporating economic and legal 
developments that have come to the fore since the 1992 revisions.7  More 
specifically, the Agencies have stated that a focal issue of these workshops will 
be aligning and updating market definition and concentration analysis to reflect 
contemporary Agency and practitioner practices.8  This is not to say that the 
entirety of the Guidelines is going to be reworked; DOJ Assistant Attorney 
General Christine Varney has stated her position that 
[I]f a Guidelines update is deemed worthwhile, I would not at this time 
anticipate departing from some of the basic elements in the current Guidelines: 
 
Upcoming Workshops, Remarks to the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association at the 
Fall Forum (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/251858.pdf. 
 5. See Varney, supra note 1, at 17; see also Deborah L. Feinstein, Editor’s Note: 
Enforcement Changes: Evolution or Revolution?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 5; Mark D. Whitener, 
Editor’s Note: change.gov, ANTITRUST, Summer 2009, at 4. 
 6. See Feinstein, supra note 5, at 5; see also J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Enforcement Priorities in the New Administration, Remarks at the Global Competition 
Review’s 2009 Competition Law Review 14 (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
speeches/rosch/091117enforceprioritiesremarks.pdf (“The 1992 Guidelines have been successful 
in large measure due to their acceptance by both agencies and every administration since their 
adoption.  The next version of the Guidelines will need to attain a similar level of consensus to be 
successful.”). 
 7. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES: 
QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/ 
hmg-questions.pdf [hereinafter, FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS FOR 
PUBLIC COMMENT]; see Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Merger Guidelines Workshops, Remarks at the Georgetown Law Global Antitrust 
Enforcement Symposium 10 (Sept. 22, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/250238.pdf (“The lack of modern Supreme Court precedent also underscores the need 
for Horizontal Merger Guidelines that accurately reflect the best economic and legal reasoning.”); 
see also Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review: A Midterm Report, LAW360 (Dec. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.crai.com/uploadedFiles/Publications/horizontal-merger-guidelines-re 
view-a-midterm-report.pdf?n=6032. 
 8. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC 
COMMENT, supra note 7, at 1 (“Updating the Guidelines could serve two primary and closely 
related goals.  First, updated guidelines could more accurately and clearly describe current 
Agency practice.  Second, updated guidelines could reflect and incorporate learning and 
experience gained since 1992.”) (emphasis added). 
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the use of the hypothetical-monopolist test to define relevant markets, the use 
of HHI measures of concentration to establish structural presumptions, the 
centrality of the inquiry into competitive effects, the “timeliness, likelihood, 
and sufficiency” structure of entry analysis, and the basic treatment of 
efficiencies and failing firms.  Instead, I envision potentially updating the 
Guidelines to reflect the evolution of practice and advances in learning that 
have taken place since 1992 largely by (1) clarifying concepts in the current 
Guidelines that may not be expressed as clearly or fully as they could be, and 
(2) incorporating some of the useful guidance that already exists in the 2006 
Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines into the Guidelines 
themselves.9 
Varney’s view of incorporating useful guidance from the 2006 
Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Commentary”) has indeed 
come to fruition, as many of the proposed revisions listed in the DOJ & FTC 
Questions for Public Comment can be found in the 2006 Commentary.10  
Though revisions to the Guidelines are expected by late 2010, much of the 
market definition analysis within these pages should remain substantially the 
same, as the Commentary explains how market definition “has become deeply 
embedded in mainstream merger analysis”11 and how Attorney General Varney 
stated that the Agencies do not “anticipate departing from” basic Guidelines 
tenets, including “the use of the hypothetical-monopolist test to define relevant 
markets.”12 
This Comment will explore antitrust developments in this time of dynamic 
change, not only for antitrust practitioners specializing in merger analysis, but 
also for government, businesses, and consumers.13  More specifically, this 
 
 9. See Varney, supra note 7, at 10–11. 
 10. See FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 5–16 (2006) [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2006/03/CommentaryontheHori 
zontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2006.pdf; see also Darren S. Tucker, Seventeen Years Later: 
Thoughts on Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2009, at 
1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/545095-00024.pdf 
(“Many of the proposed revisions appear to have come directly from the 2006 Merger Guidelines 
Commentary and should not be a surprise to practitioners.”). 
 11. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 2 
(“The Guidelines five-part organizational structure [which includes market definition as part one] 
has become deeply embedded in mainstream merger analysis.”). 
 12. Varney, supra note 7, at 10. 
 13. This current potential revision to the Guidelines is also particularly interesting because 
the last revision in 1992 was undertaken by a Republican administration, and now we have the 
opportunity to see how a Democratic administration revises them.  See Deborah L. Feinstein, 
Merger Guidelines Revisited?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 8. 
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Comment will focus on antitrust enforcement of horizontal health insurance14 
mergers under a post-PPACA scenario (i.e., with health insurance exchange 
systems) and how the relevant markets—if at all—could be sensibly 
delineated. 
The rampant consolidation of the health insurance market over the past 
decade has led to a small number of large insurers dominating the insurance 
market, leaving competition anything but robust and predicted to only 
decline.15  In fact, in 2003—at a time when health insurers were less 
concentrated than 2010—three or less insurers constituted sixty-five percent of 
the commercial health insurance market in all but fourteen states.16  At that 
time, thirty-four states had Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) scores greater 
than 1800—a score which, according to the Guidelines, is indicative of high 
market concentration.17 
 
 14. Throughout this Comment, primarily when discussing horizontal mergers, health plan 
and health insurance will be used interchangeably when referring generally to the commercial or 
government entities that sell and/or administer health policies to employers and/or individuals. 
 15. JOHN HOLAHAN & LINDA BLUMBERG, URBAN INST. HEALTH POLICY CTR., CAN A 
PUBLIC INSURANCE PLAN INCREASE COMPETITION AND LOWER THE COSTS OF HEALTH 
REFORM? 2 (2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411762_public_insu 
rance.pdf; see also Alan M. Zuckerman, Are You Ready for the Next Wave of Health Care 
Provider Consolidation? (Mar. 20, 2008), http://www.hss-inc.com/documents/AMZHealth 
LeadersArticle_000.pdf (detailing a perfect storm of environmental forces converging to create a 
wave of health insurance mergers in the near future: insurance industry consolidation, tightening 
capital markets, expense increases outpace reimbursement, workforce shortages, practice 
dynamics, and large number of financially fragile providers); AM. HOSP. ASS’N, THE CASE FOR 
REINVIGORATING ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT FOR HEALTH PLAN MERGERS AND 
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT TO PROTECT CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS AND SUPPORT 
MEANINGFUL REFORM 4–5, 10 (2009) [hereinafter AHA WHITE PAPER], available at 
http://www.aha.org/aha/content/2009/pdf/09-05-11-antitrust-rep.pdf.  A chart from the AHA 
White Paper illustrating major health plan mergers, both consummated and attempted but later 
abandoned is found, infra at Appendix A. 
 16. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 15, at 2. 
 17. Id. at 3; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra 
note 4, § 1.51.  In case the reader is not particularly familiar with HHI thresholds, they can be 
fairly succinctly characterized.  The Guidelines identify three concentration levels as “useful 
indicator[s] of the likely potential competitive effect of a merger.”  Id. § 1.51.  Markets with a 
post-merger HHI below 1000 are regarded as unconcentrated; markets with a post-merger HHI 
between 1000 and 1800 are regarded as moderately concentrated; and markets with a post-merger 
HHI above 1800 are regarded as highly concentrated.  Id. § 1.51.  According to the Guidelines, 
“mergers in unconcentrated [(<1000)] markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects”; 
“mergers in, or resulting in, moderately concentrated markets [(1000–1800)] may raise 
competitive concerns” (depending on the increase in HHI); “and mergers in, or resulting in, 
highly concentrated markets [(>1800)] raise competitive concerns, that, depending on the size of 
the combined firm, are presumed to be anticompetitive.”  Id.; Timothy J. Muris & Bilal Sayyed, 
Three Key Principles for Revising the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 6 (Fed. Trade Comm’n 
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At the time of this writing, President Obama had just signed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) into law, which was 
amended seven days later by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act 
(HCERA).18  The primary purpose of the HCERA was amending various 
spending and revenue provisions within PPACA.19 
This Comment has a modest objective: a plenary analysis of the recently 
passed health care reform bill and general antitrust principles is beyond its 
scope; however, in the interest of a thorough analysis, a succinct background 
of the material germane to the market definition discussion is included along 
with additional references for peripheral research along the way.20  As such, 
this Comment is organized as follows: Part I will sketch and explain the 
general contours and concepts behind health insurance exchanges.  This 
section’s purpose is to broach several key foundational aspects that will be 
referenced in Part VIII, where PPACA is analyzed, and in Part IX, where a 
sensible solution for delineating the relevant geographic and product markets is 
proposed.21 
Part II—to contextually orient the reader—will include general comments 
on the Guidelines’ historical pedigree, tracing the evolution since their 1968 
inception.22  Briefly chronicling the Guidelines up to the 1997 revision, this 
section will also articulate the Guidelines’ key purposes and goals.23  This 
section goes on to introduce Section 7 of the Clayton Act—the chief federal 
 
Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment No. 545095-00053, 
2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/545095-00053.pdf. 
 18. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 19. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM SUPPLEMENT TO HEALTH LAW: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1 (Am. Casebook Ser., 6th ed. 2008 & Supp. 2010).  For a 
summary of PPACA, see HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SUMMARY OF NEW HEALTH 
REFORM LAW (2010) [hereinafter KFF CHART], available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/up 
load/8061.pdf. 
 20. The antitrust analysis in this Comment will be limited to that of the Unites States.  For a 
comprehensive discussion on the international antitrust laws, see generally 22 MARK R. JOELSON, 
AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO THE OPERATION OF UNITED STATES, 
EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION LAWS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Int’l 
Competition Law Ser., 3d ed. 2006). 
 21. See infra Parts VIII–IX and accompanying text. 
 22. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 13,101 [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 GUIDELINES]. 
 23. Although the Guidelines were also revised in 1997, that revision pertained solely to 
efficiencies, which although significant (e.g., in merger simulation and where mergers have 
vertical aspects that enable the merged firm to eliminate double-marginalization), it is not 
particularly germane to this Comment.  See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 20. 
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enforcement statute for mergers—and details the five-part process promulgated 
by the Guidelines and used by the Agencies in merger investigation.24 
With the Guidelines’ framework securely in place, Part III walks through 
the logistical aspects of Agency merger enforcement, introducing how merging 
corporations above a certain size must comply with the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act25 and its stringent compliance timeframes for companies proposing to 
merge.26  This section also broaches several key indicia and metrics used by 
the Agencies during merger investigations, including market concentration, 
market power, market shares, and market definition. 
Part IV specifically addresses some of the key idiosyncrasies of merger 
analysis that are particularly germane to health care.  Though many antitrust 
principles apply similarly for mergers in health care and other commercial 
markets, the health care industry has a combination of several unique 
attributes—including information asymmetries, complex regulatory schemes, 
market failures, and effects of third party payors—that merit special 
considerations throughout the merger analysis.27 
Part V has two primary goals: first, to articulate, from a conceptual 
viewpoint, the chief aspects of the Guidelines that pertain to market definition 
analysis—namely how these facets are structured in the Guidelines and 
regarded in the Commentary; and second, to articulate how the Guidelines are 
actually employed in contemporary antitrust practice.  The conceptual 
discussion describes the role of market definition in antitrust analysis and how 
the ultimate question that Agencies seek to answer is whether prices will 
increase post-merger.28  This is an extremely important analysis as the market 
concentration and marker power measures all hinge on—and are meaningless 
without—consistently and correctly defined markets.29  Finally this section 
will briefly discuss market concentration ratios, namely the HHIs, which 
function as the Guidelines’ analytical core.30  The second discussion on de 
 
 24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2. 
 25. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 
1383 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18a) (2006)). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b). 
 27. See 1 JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 
§ 1.1 (2010). 
 28. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12. 
 29. David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Monopoly, Monopsony, and Market Definition: 
An Antitrust Perspective on Market Concentration Among Health Insurers, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
25 (2004) (“It is essential to define ‘markets’ correctly and consistently, or else measures of 
concentration among states are meaningless.”). 
 30. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12.  HHI is a measure of concentration that takes into 
account both market share and the size distribution of firms.  Dennis W. Carlton, Market 
Definition: Use and Abuse 8–9 (Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper No. EAG 07-6, 2007), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/225693.pdf.  It is derived by calculating each 
firm’s share of the market, squaring it, and then summing the square of the shares.  Id.  As a 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] HEALTH CARE REFORM & ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1507 
facto antitrust practice utilizes commentary from several experienced 
practitioners as a means of broaching the divergence between what the 
Guidelines preach, and what is practiced. 
Part VI includes practitioner commentary as to why the Guidelines have 
been so durable over the years.  This analysis looks largely to the Guidelines’ 
resistance to over-specificity and a paucity of quantitative presumptions as 
reasons for why the Guidelines have proven adaptable to even the most 
extraordinary horizontal mergers. 
Part VII will explore the three Agency-challenged health insurance plan 
mergers to date, namely Aetna/Prudential (1999), UnitedHealth/PacifiCare 
(2006), and UnitedHealth/Sierra (2008).31  This is not to say that the Agencies 
have only publicly investigated three mergers throughout the years—as the 
Agencies have been more aggressive in that respect—but these are the only 
three that have been formally challenged in court.32  Walking through these 
mergers will help expose several irreducible market definition principles that 
remain consistent throughout the challenges and, thus, expose those which are 
likely to remain consistent throughout a post-PPACA regime. 
Part VIII will explore PPACA and the aspects that are especially germane 
to the merger discussion.  This primary purpose of this section is to familiarize 
and orient the reader with the key provisions pertaining to PPACA’s health 
insurance exchange systems that are heavily referenced in the subsequent 
section.  This section is intended to serve as a very brief summary of selected 
aspects of PPACA, with a more focused discussion on the health insurance 
exchange aspects. 
Finally, Part IX will probe thorny market definition issues that 
enforcement agencies will likely encounter when challenging (or attempting to 
challenge) health plan mergers in a post-health care reform regime.  In this 
 
result, markets with fewer firms or markets with more firms but a few with very high shares will 
each be highly concentrated.  Id.  Although the current HHI thresholds have been the subject of 
much criticism as not accurately predictive of anticompetitive effects, this Comment focuses on 
market definition and, thus, will not more than briefly discuss HHIs. 
 31. See Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 1:08-
cv-00322-ESH (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Sierra Impact Statement], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f230400/230448.pdf (UnitedHealth acquisition of Sierra Health 
Services); Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 
1:05CV02436, (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2006) [hereinafter PacifiCare Impact Statement], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f215000/215034.pdf (UnitedHealth acquisition of PacifiCare); 
Revised Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Aetna Inc., No. 3-99CV1398-H (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Aetna Impact Statement], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ 
cases/f2600/2648.pdf. 
 32. See AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 6; see also infra Appendix A.  Interestingly, 
the DOJ has sought divestitures of health plan mergers despite post-merger market shares being 
below levels typically associated with anticompetitive effects.  See AHA WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 15, at 4–5, 10. 
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section, sensible solutions are propounded for defining the product and 
geographic markets within PPACA’s health insurance exchange system, and 
whether markets can be defined rigorously come 2014, when the exchanges 
are—hopefully—fully operational.33  This section, and this Comment 
generally, speaks to market definition particularly from the seller’s side—
”where the competitive concern is the health plan’s market power in selling its 
product” (e.g., selling insurance plans)—and does not focus on buyer-side 
issues—where the competitive concern is the health plan’s monopsony power 
as a purchaser (e.g., insurer buying physician’s services to provide to eligible 
enrollees).34  The framework upon which this Comment will discuss possible 
market definition approaches is that of hypothetical merging health plans that 
are sellers of health insurance and operating within a post-PPACA health 
insurance exchange system. 
Admittedly, market definition is merely a starting point in analyzing a 
merger’s impact on consumers, but given the current Guidelines’ methodology 
for market definition, a health insurance exchange system would not only be an 
issue of first impression for enforcement agencies, courts, and state attorneys 
general, but would also test the acclaimed malleability of the Guidelines’ 
framework which has, up to this point, undoubtedly passed the test of time.35 
I.  BACKGROUND: HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE SYSTEMS 
The notion of a health insurance exchange system is not an entirely new 
concept, but nevertheless is one unquestionably on the forefront of health care 
today.36  A health insurance exchange system is essentially a marketplace that 
will offer consumers a choice among high quality, low price health care 
options that are comprehensive and apples-to-apples comparable.37  For the 
 
 33. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311, 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b) (2010). 
 34. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 147 
(4th ed. 2010); see also infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text (discussing how health 
insurance mergers raise both market and monopsony power concerns). 
 35. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 2.0 
(“[M]arket share and concentration data provide only the starting point for analyzing the 
competitive impact of a merger.”). 
 36. The idea of an exchange system was prominent during President Barack Obama’s 
campaign and was promoted by Montana Senator and Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, 
Max Baucus.  See MAX BAUCUS, CHAIRMAN, SENATE FIN. COMM., CALL TO ACTION: HEALTH 
REFORM 2009 (2008), available at http://www.aanp.org/NR/rdonlyres/D277DB51-A993-4F3F-
8F6E-00F9B2E2FCA3/0/Baucusfinalwhitepaper.pdf.  The notion of an insurance exchange 
system was also endorsed by Oregon Senator Rob Wyden, in the Healthy Americans Act, S. 391, 
111th Cong. (2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 
111_cong_bills&docid=f:s391is.txt.pdf. 
 37. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, FACT SHEET: USING A HEALTH-INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE TO POOL RISK AND PROTECT ENROLLEES (Health Reform Issue Ser., 2009) 
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unemployed, individuals who cannot afford health insurance, and small 
businesses that cannot afford small group health insurance, the exchange 
system is promulgated in hopes of being the long-awaited panacea by 
providing an array of affordable options.38  For employees of large companies 
providing group coverage, the exchange system means essentially keeping that 
current insurance plan, but benefiting from added safeguards preventing unfair 
and deceptive insurance practices.39  Further, the exchange marketplace makes 
health insurance more portable for individuals.40  If an employee loses her job, 
changes jobs, or relocates, that person (and her dependents) can easily explore 
the exchange for a new, affordable plan.41  Additionally, the high quality and 
low cost attribute of the exchange will act as a crutch beyond the eighteen-
month window that is currently provided by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act (COBRA).42 
A primary avenue by which the exchange system garners its allure is its 
ability to lower health insurance costs, which is accomplished by inciting 
insurers to vigorously compete for enrollees.43  Exchange systems are able to 
promote vigorous competition among insurers, because the insurers’ ability to 
attract enrollees will depend purely on cost and quality of coverage, not 
“benefit manipulation” or the ability to attract only healthy individuals and 
reject, drop, or otherwise deter the “sicker, costlier ones.”44  More succinctly, 
“[t]he aim is to focus competition among plans on the price of coverage and 
minimize the tendency for plans to vary benefits in order to attract healthier 
than average enrollees.”45 
 
[hereinafter CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INSURANCE FACT SHEET], available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-14-09health-fact.pdf. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Frequently Asked Questions About Health Insurance Reform, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/realitycheck/faq#i1.  Examples of these deceptive insurance practices 
include those that seek to limit or cancel your coverage if you get sick by finding clerical errors in 
application forms.  Id. 
 40. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Explaining Health Care Reform: What Are Health 
Insurance Exchanges? 1 (2009) [hereinafter KFF EXPLAINING HEALTHCARE REFORM], available 
at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7908.pdf. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 § 2202, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300bb-2 (2006). 
 43. H.R. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, ENERGY & COMMERCE, EDUCATION & LABOR, 
111TH CONG., HEALTH REFORM AT A GLANCE: THE HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE 1 (2009), 
available at http://maloney.house.gov/documents/health/healthcarereform/EXCHANGE.pdf. 
 44. Id.; see also CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INSURANCE FACT SHEET, supra 
note 37. 
 45. KFF EXPLAINING HEALTHCARE REFORM, supra note 40. 
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II.  BACKGROUND: THE MERGER GUIDELINES’ PEDIGREE 
The DOJ first issued guidelines for merger enforcement in 1968.46  
Entirely superseded today by the 1997 Guidelines, the 1968 Guidelines 
evaluated the market in which consummated mergers took place in terms of the 
four-firm concentration ratio.47  In 1982, the DOJ, through Assistant Attorney 
General William Baxter, issued revised Guidelines that introduced the still 
functional “SSNIP”48 test for market definition, established new HHI 
concentration thresholds, and included factors germane to assessing 
competitive effects and likelihood of entry.49  In 1984, the DOJ again revised 
the Guidelines—affording less weight to HHI concentration statistics and 
tweaking the treatment of imports.50  The 1992 Guidelines also diluted (again) 
the HHI threshold significance, revised the discussion of entry requirements—
partly in response to Baker Hughes,51 and implemented unilateral effects 
analysis.52  In 1992, the Agencies for the first time issued joint horizontal 
merger enforcement guidelines; five years later in 1997, the Agencies issued 
their next joint Guidelines revisions, namely to the Efficiencies section.53  The 
most recent jointly-issued publication clarifying the Guidelines is the 
Agencies’ 2006 Commentary that seeks to “provide greater transparency and 
foster deeper understanding regarding antitrust law enforcement.”54  Save for 
 
 46. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 19 (3d ed. 2008); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 GUIDELINES, supra note 22.  Each iteration of the U.S. Merger 
Guidelines is available—for historical purposes—at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger.htm. 
 47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1968 GUIDELINES, supra note 22, at 20,543 (“In a market in 
which the shares of the four largest firms amount to approximately 75% or more, the Department 
will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms accounting for, approximately, the following 
percentages of the market . . . .”). 
 48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.11.  
SSNIP stands for “small but significant and nontransitory increase in price.”  Id.; see also infra 
notes 115–22 and accompanying text. 
 49. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), 
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,102. 
 50. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1984), 
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,103. 
 51. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that rebuttal 
of prima facie case that merger will lessen competition in a market does not require clear showing 
that entry into the market by competitors will be “quick and effective,” rather, evidence on variety 
of factors can rebut prima facie case). 
 52. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.5 (HHI thresholds), § 2.2 (unilateral effects), § 3.0 (entry 
requirements). 
 53. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.0. 
 54. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at v. 
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the 1997 revision of merger efficiencies, the Guidelines have not been revised 
in eighteen years—the longest hiatus since their 1968 inception.55 
The Agencies’ joint issuance of the Guidelines was an effort to describe 
the methodologies and standards used in applying the U.S. antitrust laws to 
horizontal mergers under review.56  The primary statute on point for horizontal 
mergers is Section 7 of the Clayton Act.57  The Guidelines’ aim is blocking 
mergers that—according to Section 7—”may be substantially to lessen 
competition or to tend to create a monopoly.”58  Section 0.2 of the Guidelines 
employs a five-part—not step—process that the Agencies purportedly use 
when evaluating proposed mergers.59  First, the relevant market is defined and 
used to measure market concentration.60  Second, Agencies consider whether 
potentially adverse anticompetitive effects might result from the merger.61  
Third—the entry analysis—Agencies examine the ease with which firms may 
enter and exit the market, and whether entry by new firms would mitigate or 
eliminate any potential anticompetitive effects.62  Fourth, a determination is 
made as to whether efficiencies may arise from the merger that would lower 
 
 55. Tucker, supra note 10, at 2. 
 56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0. 
 57. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).  The Act, as amended in 1950, addresses 
specific practices not clearly prohibited by the Sherman Act “such as mergers and interlocking 
directorates.”  Id.; see also Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 18); FED. TRADE COMM’N, AN FTC GUIDE TO THE ANTITRUST LAWS 2 (2007).  The 
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 “also bans certain discriminatory 
prices, services, and allowances in dealings between merchants.”  15 U.S.C. § 18; see also 
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13); FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra, at 2.  “The Clayton Act was amended again in 1976 by the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvements Act to require companies planning” to consummate a merger above a 
certain size to notify the government prior to consummation.  15 U.S.C. § 18; see also Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 18a); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra, at 2. 
 58. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1; see 
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 59. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2.  The 
“five-step” label can be misleading because the Agencies do not invariably apply the Guidelines 
as a linear model that must always start with market definition and end with efficiencies or failing 
assets.  Tucker, supra note 10, at 5–6.  Indeed, “[market] concentration may be uninformative in a 
unilateral effects analysis, which focuses on the loss of localized competition and other 
competitors’ ability to reposition.”  Id. at 6 (internal citations omitted); see also Jonathan B. 
Baker & Steven C. Salop, Should Concentration Be Dropped From the Merger Guidelines?, 33 
UWLA L. REV. 3, 12 (2001) (“It is now widely accepted among economists that unilateral effects 
analysis does not strictly require a single discrete relevant market to be defined with the [SSNIP] 
test; demand elasticities and diversion ratios are sufficient.”). 
 60. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 
10, at 37. 
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costs and offset any potential anticompetitive effects.63  Fifth, Agencies will 
consider failing and exiting assets, and determine whether the failing firm 
defense would apply.64 
The benefits of having clarity and transparency in the Guidelines are 
ubiquitous.  A chief advantage is that counsel for prospectively merging 
corporations can advise clients on the analysis undertaken by the Agencies, in 
determining whether to clear or take enforcement action against a proposed 
merger.65  The ability to predict whether the DOJ/FTC review will result in an 
anticompetitive determination comports with the Agencies’ goal of “allow[ing] 
transactions unlikely substantially to lessen competition to proceed as 
expeditiously as possible.”66  Another key advantage of clarity and 
transparency is the ability for the Agencies to guide and educate the courts on 
the right questions to ask and how to possibly answer them.67 
Alternatively, Agency non-transparency in this regard can have an equally 
deleterious impact, potentially cost merging parties millions of dollars, arduous 
investigation-related delays, and even jeopardize the proposed merger and its 
financing.68  As a result of being in the dark regarding the Agency’s mode of 
analysis, merging companies can spend millions on economists and 
econometrics, just to have Agency staff respond that the data is 
unconvincing.69 
III.  BACKGROUND: LOGISTICS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have 
complementary roles in antitrust enforcement insofar as their authorities tend 
to overlap, but since each has developed respective areas of expertise—as well 
as to avoid duplicative efforts—only one Agency will conduct an antitrust 
 
 63. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2. 
 64. Id.  It is notable that the Agencies’ methodology of defining the relevant product and 
geographic market as a preliminary step in the process comports with Supreme Court precedent.  
See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 510 (1974) (“[A] delineation of proper 
geographic and product markets is a necessary precondition to assessment of the [Section 7 
claim] . . . .”). 
 65. Feinstein, supra note 6, at 6. 
 66. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1. 
 67. Feinstein, supra note 13, at 9.  Because of varying levels of sophistication, the 
Guidelines must be especially versatile in order to be utilized by the Agencies and by the courts, 
because the Agencies have an arsenal of Ph.D. economists on staff, whereas courts do not.  Id. 
 68. Gregory K. Leonard & Lawrence Wu, Revising the Merger Guidelines: Second Request 
Screens and the Agencies’ Empirical Approach to Competitive Effects, GCP: THE ANTITRUST 
CHRON., Dec. 2009, at 1. 
 69. Feinstein, supra note 6, at 6; see also Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12.  (“Guidelines could 
do a better job of moving beyond the economic framework and describing to some extent the 
kinds of facts that the agencies find to be relevant in their analysis.”) (emphasis added). 
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investigation for a particular merger.70  For health insurance plan mergers, the 
DOJ often spearheads the investigation.71 
In accordance with Section 7 of the Clayton Act, in order to block the 
proposed merger, the reviewing Agency must show that the merger’s 
competitive effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
create a monopoly.”72  More specifically, and with regard to market definition, 
the government can establish a presumption that a proposed horizontal merger 
that “substantially increases market concentration is likely to be 
anticompetitive.”73  In practice, this means that an Agency will investigate 
whether a proposed merger will likely lead to increased consumer prices by 
evaluating the likely competitive effects on price, output, and efficiencies.74 
The investigation process formally begins when the companies wanting to 
merge file their Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) documents.75  HSR mandates that 
merging parties in a transaction above a certain size ($63.4 million) notify the 
Agencies before consummating the proposed merger, so that the Agencies 
have time to analyze the transaction’s likely competitive effects.76  Parties are 
 
 70. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 57, at 1. 
 71. DOJ has led the investigation for all three previously challenged health plan mergers.  
See infra Part VII, for a discussion on those mergers. 
 72. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006); see also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust 
Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. 
THEORETICAL ECON. 1, 1 (2010), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art9/. 
 73. Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 3. 
 74. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 2–3, 
18. 
 75. Id. at 1. 
 76. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 18a; FED. TRADE COMM’N PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFFICE, 
TO FILE OR NOT TO FILE: WHEN YOU MUST FILE A PREMERGER NOTIFICATION REPORT FORM 
(2008).  In assessing whether a merger qualifies as above $63.4 million, the HSR Rules require 
that “assets, voting securities or NCI [non-corporate interests] of the acquired person that have 
already been acquired must be aggregated with those that will be acquired in the proposed 
transaction.  When what has previously been purchased plus what will be bought in the present 
acquisition meets the size of transaction criteria, the transaction becomes reportable unless an 
exemption applies.”  FED. TRADE COMM’N PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFFICE, supra, pt. V.A; 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c) (detailing exceptions to the rule).  Notably, on January 13, 2010, the 
FTC lowered its HSR notification threshold.  Compare Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for 
Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 1687 (Jan. 13, 2009), with Revised Jurisdictional 
Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 3468 (Jan. 21, 2010).  Approved by a 
4-0 vote, the new threshold for reporting a proposed merger has decreased from $65.2 million to 
$63.4 million.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commission Announces Revised Filing 
Thresholds for Clayton Act Antitrust Reviews (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/01/ 
hsr-safeharbor.shtm.  The reduced threshold will be effective thirty days after publication in the 
Federal Register.  Id.  This downward adjustment—the first of its kind—is perhaps unsurprising 
amidst this currently anemic economy, because the thresholds are objectively indexed to the GNP 
and adjusted annually, and the economy has depressed the GNP.  Richard Vanderford, Hart-
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forbidden from consummating the merger until expiration of at least the initial 
thirty-day waiting period—unless the Agency decides to issue a Second 
Request—which gives the Agency another thirty days from the parties 
“substantial compliance” to review the proposed merger.77  In order to be 
substantially compliant, the merging parties are required to supply a litany of 
information, documents, and databases demanded by the reviewing Agency.78  
Even if the Agencies do not issue a Second Request, the merging parties must 
still wait thirty days from that initial request before consummating the 
merger.79 
Because mergers are necessarily prospective in nature, and since it would 
be extremely obtrusive to “unscramble the eggs” and separate the firms post-
merger, antitrust evaluation of a merger’s future effects is impossible to 
ascertain with certainty.80  Thus, because the Agencies cannot directly predict 
an anticompetitive price effect, the Agencies rely on various proxies and 
indicia—articulated in the Guidelines—including market concentration, market 
definition, market shares, and the “likelihood of entry or repositioning.”81  The 
vast majority of times, delineating the relevant geographic and product markets 
is a prerequisite to reaching any of these conclusions, and as such, it is among 
the most vigorously disputed aspects of horizontal merger analysis.82 
 
Scott-Rodino Drops for First Time, LAW360 (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
144463. 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)–(b), (e); Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 1; see also FED. TRADE 
COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1–2 (“A second request 
may be necessary when it is not possible within thirty days to gather and analyze the facts 
necessary to address appropriately the competitive concerns that may arise at the threshold of the 
investigation, such as when parties to a merger appear to have relatively high shares in the market 
or markets in which they compete.”).  By and large, the consummation of proposed mergers goes 
smoothly; for over 95% of the Hart-Scott-Rodino reportable transactions, the Agencies are able to 
determine within the initial fifteen- (for cash tender offers) or thirty-day waiting period that the 
proposed merger will not substantially lessen competition.  FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1. 
 78. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(d); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, 
supra note 10, at 3.  In addition to information provided by the merging parties, the Agencies can 
utilize “civil investigative demands” to subpoena information from outsiders.  Farrell & Shapiro, 
supra note 72, at 1 n.4. 
 79. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a), (b), (e); FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1–2. 
 80. Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 1; David A. Argue & Richard T. Shin, An Innovative 
Approach to an Old Problem: Hospital Merger Simulation, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 49. 
 81. Argue & Shin, supra note 80, at 49; see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.2. 
 82. Argue & Shin, supra note 80, at 49. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] HEALTH CARE REFORM & ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1515 
IV.  REGULATION OF HORIZONTAL MERGERS WITHIN THE HEALTH INSURANCE 
SECTOR 
The U.S. antitrust laws apply to all industries within the health care sector, 
and many apply to health care no differently than any other business sector.83  
Despite several similarities, however, health care industries do “exhibit certain 
unusual economic traits that must be [carefully] considered in analyzing health 
care antitrust issues”; this includes the effects of third party insurance and 
intermediaries, information deficiencies, market failures, a prevalence of 
professionals providing health services, government financing, information 
asymmetries, nonprofit firms, and regulations reflecting a particular concern 
about quality.84 
In addition, mergers between health plans in particular generate great 
concern and scrutiny because health insurers function as both buyers and 
sellers: buyers of medical services from physicians and hospitals and sellers of 
insurance to consumer enrollees.85  Because health insurers wear both hats, so 
to speak, a health insurance merger can simultaneously effectuate an increase 
in the merged firm’s market power and an increase in that firm’s monopsony 
power.86  On one hand, the market power concern is raised by whether the 
merged health plan could increase premiums and/or reduce the variety of plans 
offered or quality of services.87  On the other hand, the monopsony power 
concern is raised by whether the merged health plan could depress physician 
reimbursement below competitive levels or otherwise hamper provider 
innovation by other means.88  The concern about the merged health plan 
depressing reimbursement to below competitive levels is largely linked to the 
vast share of patients that the health insurance firm would control (and could 
poach from the physician) post-merger.89 
 
 83. MILES, supra note 27, § 1.1. 
 84. Id. 
 85. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF 
COMPETITION ch. 6, at 1 (2004). 
 86. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 2; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 85, ch. 6, at 1. 
 87. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 2. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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V.  CONCEPTUAL & PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO MARKET DEFINITION 
ANALYSIS 
A. Conceptual Approach: Exploring the Theoretical Underpinnings of 
Market Definition 
“Throughout the history of U.S. antitrust litigation, the outcome of more 
cases has surely turned on market definition than on any other substantive 
issue.  Market definition is often the most critical step in evaluating market 
power and determining whether business conduct has or likely will have 
anticompetitive effects.”90  These statements accurately assert market 
definition’s importance because—under America’s antitrust laws—the legality 
of a business practice is frequently determined by whether the defendant 
(usually the seller) possesses market power.91  A firm possesses market power 
if it has “the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a 
significant period of time.”92  The importance of market power in the 
Guidelines cannot be overstated, as the Guidelines state that their “focus [is] on 
the one potential source of gain that is of concern under the antitrust laws: 
market power.”93  This is perhaps unsurprising, given that a central purpose of 
antitrust enforcement is protecting economic competition on consumers’ 
behalf, and since market power is a tool used to predict whether a merger will 
negatively affect consumers through increased price, reduced quality, 
decreased innovation, change in terms of service, adverse contractual 
provisions, and the like.94 
 
 90. Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 
129 (2007); see also MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1 (“The relevant market is one of the most 
important and complex variables in antitrust analysis.”); Stephan M. Levy, Are Relevant Markets 
Ever Irrelevant? 2 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
Review, Public Comment No. 545095-00020, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/com 
ments/horizontalmergerguides/index.shtm (“The issue of the relevant market is particularly 
important.  Many antitrust cases—both merger and non-merger—are decided by the outcome of 
how the relevant market is defined.”).  But see Robert H. Gertner & Kevin M. Murphy, 
Comments on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 6–7 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment No. 545095-00021, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/index.shtm (“Market definition should 
never play a pivotal role, in the sense that the result of market definition only is the basis for 
concluding that a merger is likely to reduce competition.”). 
 91. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1. 
 92. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.1; see 
also FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 1 (“The 
core concern of the antitrust laws, including as they pertain to mergers between rivals, is the 
creation or enhancement of market power.”) (emphasis added). 
 93. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 0.1. 
 94. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.3; see also AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
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In antitrust parlance, a market is comprised of a collection of products and 
geographic locations—hence, the product market and geographic market 
dichotomization—that are delineated in an effort to infer a firm’s market 
power and the likely competitive effects of the proposed merger.95  “The 
ultimate purpose for defining a relevant market is not to identify particular 
products or geographical areas, but to identify those competitors of a firm  (or 
group of firms acting concertedly) that could prevent the firm or firms from 
exercising market power by raising price.”96  Knowing where a firm’s 
competition occurs helps identify whether there are competitive forces that 
could constrain the merged firm’s ability to exercise market power (e.g., 
inflating price of health insurance premiums and reduced quality of 
coverage).97  Once the relevant market is defined, that information can then be 
used in calculating the relative size distribution for firms operating in the same 
product and geographic market(s) (typically quantified as market shares).98  
From these market concentration statistics, the Agencies can then determine 
the firm’s market share, from which the firm’s market power may be 
inferred—along with associated structural presumptions.99  In other words, 
market definition statistics strongly influence market concentration statistics, 
which determine market share, which then determine market power.  As is 
discussed infra, high market shares typically indicate the presence of market 
power, and the opposite a lack thereof.100 
The necessity of defining the relevant product and geographic markets 
arises from Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which requires that “substantiality” 
be measured “over a line of commerce and section of the country—in other 
 
 95. Baker, supra note 90, at 130; see infra notes 101–27 and accompanying text, for brief 
discussion of competitive effects. 
 96. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1. 
 97. Richard Gilbert & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Comments on Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1 
(Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment 
No. 545095-00014, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/ 
index.shtm. 
 98. Baker, supra note 90, at 130. 
 99. Gilbert & Rubinfeld, supra note 97, at 1; see also MILES, supra note 27, § 2.3 
(“Although market power can be proven in several ways, including demand and supply 
elasticities, reduced output, persistent supracompetitive prices or margins, persistent price 
discrimination, and persistent supracompetitive profitability, it usually is inferred from the 
defendant’s market share and significant entry and expansion barriers.”) (footnote omitted). 
 100. Baker, supra note 90, at 130.  But this is not always the case.  See MILES, supra note 27, 
§ 1.4 (“[A]lthough market share and market concentration are important indicia of market power, 
they are not sufficient to prove market power by themselves.”); see, e.g., E. Food Servs., Inc. v. 
Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, Inc., 357 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A defendant’s high 
share is only a presumptive basis for inferring market power (entry barriers to the market may be 
very low); but a low share is almost always an indication that the defendant lacks market power.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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words, a relevant market.”101  Because the string of computations ultimately 
trying to predict market power are a function of market definition, it is 
especially critical that markets be sensibly defined, as the market power metric 
is meaningless if the relevant markets are erroneously or arbitrarily defined.102  
If one defines the market too narrowly, market shares likely will be artificially 
high; if defined too broadly, the market shares will likely be artificially diluted 
and low—potentially masking a firm’s market power.103 
Market power may “substantially lessen competition” in two ways—
through coordinated effects or unilateral effects.104  Coordinated effects pose a 
threat when a merger would increase the chance that post-merger, competitors 
will either expressly or tacitly coordinate their pricing or other competitive 
actions.105  Alternatively, competition can be lessened by unilateral effects—if 
the merger creates a likelihood that the merged firm, acting on its own (not 
coordinating with other rival firms), would increase prices or otherwise 
exercise greater market power than pre-merger.106  It may be helpful to think of 
these competitive effects (viz. unilateral and coordinated) as the “main course” 
and market definition as the “hors d’oeuvre” in the merger evaluation 
dinner.107 
1. Market Definition: Demand (Buyer) Substitution, Juxtaposed with 
Supplier (Seller) Substitution 
Courts have repeatedly stressed that market definition should focus on 
demand (buyer) substitution, as opposed to supply (seller) substitution.108  As a 
rule of thumb, “[t]he exercise of market power requires that the firm or firms 
involved (collectively) face a relatively inelastic demand curve for a product at 
 
 101. Feinstein, supra note 13, at 13; see also Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 102. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 29, at 26. 
 103. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Comments of J. Gregory Sidak and David 
J. Teece 9 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public 
Comment No. 545095-00025, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontal 
mergerguides/index.shtm. 
 104. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 17. 
 105. Id.; see also Aileen Thompson, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Merger Analysis at the Federal 
Trade Commission: Two Recent Retail Cases 1 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/thomp 
smerg.pdf (“A merger may enhance the ability to coordinate by reducing the number of 
independent competitors.”). 
 106. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 17. 
 107. Gilbert & Rubinfeld, supra note 97, at 5. 
 108. Baker, supra note 90, at 132; see also United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 
(Cellophane Case), 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956).  This Comment will exclusively focus on demand 
substitution, as this is the prevailing economic force that market definition is employed to account 
for today.  Baker, supra note 90, at 132.  For a discussion on supply substitution and its 
shortcomings in the market definition analysis, see id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] HEALTH CARE REFORM & ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1519 
pre-merger prices.”109  This demand curve is important because it is only when 
that curve is relatively inelastic can it be profitable for a firm or firms to 
simultaneously raise price by reducing output.110  Thus, the focal issue 
becomes which products would be acceptable alternatives from the buyer’s 
perspective.111  Accordingly, in 1956, the United States Supreme Court in E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Cellophane Case) held that the relevant product 
market consists of goods “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the 
same purposes.”112  In United States v. Aluminum Company of America (Rome 
Cable), eight years later, “the Supreme Court confirmed that market definition 
turned solely on buyer substitution possibilities . . . .”113  The DOJ and FTC 
have followed suit, as the 1992 Guidelines “focus[] solely on buyer 
substitution factors”—i.e., possible consumer responses—and promulgate the 
infamous “hypothetical monopolist” test, which focuses on demand 
structure.114 
2. Conceptual Approach: Market Definition and the Hypothetical 
Monopolist “SSNIP” Test 
Absent direct evidence of anticompetitive effects spawning from a merger, 
the Guidelines stipulate that a relevant product market is to be defined using 
what is known as the “hypothetical monopolist” test.115  The test starts by 
looking at the merging firms and identifying each product produced or sold by 
each firm.116  Then “the Agency will delineate the product market to be a 
product or group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm 
 
 109. Gilbert & Rubinfeld, supra note 97, at 2. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Baker, supra note 90, at 132. 
 112. Cellophane Case, 351 U.S. at 395; Baker, supra note 90, at 132. 
 113. Baker, supra note 90, at 132 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome 
Cable), 377 U.S. 271, 276–77 (1964)).  As Professor Baker explains, the Court in Rome Cable 
held that market definition turned solely on buyer substitution possibilities when it defined 
insulated copper conductor and insulated aluminum conductor as separate markets because of 
insufficient demand substitution between the two, notwithstanding the dissent’s emphasis on the 
extensive supply substitution, or production flexibility.  Baker, supra note 90, at 132; see also 
Rome Cable, 377 U.S. at 276–77. 
 114. Baker, supra note 90, at 132–33.  A “market” is defined as “a product or group of 
products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was the only present and future 
seller of those products . . . likely would impose at least a ‘small but significant and 
nontransitory’ increase in price [SSNIP].”   U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.11 
 115. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.11; see 
Levy, supra note 90, at 1 (noting that in many cases there is direct evidence demonstrating that 
the proposed merger would be anticompetitive, and that in those instances evidence—or lack 
thereof—of anticompetitive effects may render the hypothetical monopolist test unnecessary). 
 116. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 5. 
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that was the only present and future seller of those products (‘monopolist’) 
likely would impose at least a ‘small but significant and nontransitory’ increase 
in price [“SSNIP”].”117  In other words, “[t]he relevant market consists of the 
smallest number of firms that, acting unilaterally or in concert, could profitably 
implement a small but significant and non-transitory price increase above the 
competitive level.”118  Because the relevant market largely depends on 
consumer alternatives and substitutes, the relevant product market should 
include all products or services that are reasonably interchangeable to 
consumers; this substitutability is most often (and easily) demonstrated through 
cross-elasticities of demand or diversion ratios.119  If a SSNIP would be 
unprofitable, that is, if buyers would substitute other products or locations if 
faced with a SSNIP, then the candidate market is too narrow.120  If the 
candidate market is found to be too narrow, the test “iteratively broadens the 
candidate market [for each product or location] by adding the next-best 
substitute.”121  The next-best substitute is the product accounting for the largest 
“diversion of demand” (i.e., diversion ratio) in response to a SSNIP.122 
“The relevant geographic market . . . is the geographical area in which the 
relevant seller [usually the defendant] operates and the area to which customers 
could and would turn to purchase the product if the seller attempted to increase 
its price.”123  As a relevant geographic market is comprised of the firms that 
could collectively raise prices in a profitable manner, this consideration turns 
on whether customers would travel further to seek alternative sellers, thereby, 
rendering the price increase unprofitable.124  Ultimately, “[a] relevant product 
market emerges as the smallest group of products that satisfies the hypothetical 
monopolist test.”125 
The Guidelines’ hypothetical monopolist test is conceptually 
straightforward, but at times complicated and coarse in its market definition 
methodology.  The test is most easily applied in determining markets for 
 
 117. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.1. 
 118. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1. 
 119. Id. 
 120. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, § 1.0; Baker, 
supra note 90, at 133. 
 121. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 5; 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 6. 
 122. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, at 6 n.9. 
 123. MILES, supra note 27, § 2.1. 
 124. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES, supra note 4, 
§ 1.21 (“[T]he Agency will delineate the geographic market to be a region such that a 
hypothetical monopolist that was the only present or future producer of the relevant product at 
locations in that region would profitably impose at least a ‘small but significant and 
nontransitory’ increase in price, holding constant the terms of sale for all products produced 
elsewhere.”). 
 125. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 5. 
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homogeneous products (e.g., corn), yet grows cumbersome with product 
heterogeneity or when significant geographic differentiation presents itself.126  
Though the hypothetical monopolist test may seem imperfect, the Agencies 
have made it clear that it is a very useful screen for clearing benign mergers 
and that it will not be supplanted anytime soon.127 
B. Practical Approach: Exploring the De Facto Implications of Market 
Definition 
Although the Guidelines have proven to be an exceptionally durable tool 
over the past eighteen years,128 the current practice and mode of analysis has 
evolved, making this an opportune time to refine and tweak the Guidelines to 
reflect current practice and analysis.129  As previously mentioned in the 
Introduction, a primary objective of the Agencies’ Questions for Public 
Comment initiative is determining whether the Guidelines accurately and 
clearly describe contemporary Agency review practices.130  As Paul T. Denis, 
former counselor to the DOJ Assistant Attorney General-Antitrust Division, 
stated, “[T]here’s a big gap . . . between what the agencies are doing and what 
is on paper in the Guidelines.”131  If the eighty-plus comments submitted by 
practitioners in response to the Questions for Public Comment are any 
indication, there are several aspects of the Guidelines that practitioners, 
economists, and industry groups feel do not accurately and clearly describe 
current practices.132 
 
 126. Gilbert & Rubinfeld, supra note 97, at 2. 
 127. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, 
supra note 7, at 1 (“The Agencies anticipate retaining the basic ‘hypothetical monopolist’ test 
used to ensure that antitrust markets are not unduly narrowly defined.”). 
 128. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 54–55 
(2007) (“The current merger policy of the United States is fundamentally sound. . . .  There is 
general consensus that the Merger Guidelines have acted as the ‘blueprint[] for the architecture’ 
of merger analysis and, overall, provide a guide that ‘functions well.’  The Guidelines have had a 
significant influence on judicial development of merger law, which is reflected in their 
widespread acceptance by the courts as the relevant framework for analyzing merger cases.  
Conversely, the courts have occasionally influenced how the agencies have revised the 
Guidelines.  The Guidelines have also provided useful guidance and transparency to the business 
community and antitrust bar.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 129. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 8–9. 
 130. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, QUESTIONS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, 
supra note 7, at 1. 
 131. Feinstein, supra note 13, at 10–11. 
 132. Id. at 8–9 (“[D]ue to the widening gap between the Guidelines and actual agency 
practice today, the Guidelines are no longer effective in meeting that fundamental purpose [of 
informing the bar as to how the agencies are going to analyze mergers].”).  Practitioner comments 
are located on the FTC website, at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/hmgrevisedguides/in 
dex.shtm and http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/index.shtm. 
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In today’s antitrust practice, the Guidelines’ promulgated methodology is 
rarely followed in market definition.133  Most of the time, “market definition 
revolves around the identification of all products that share with the merging 
firms’ products a common set of attributes which are believed to be valued by 
customers”—not proceeding by next-best substitute.134  In practice, the 
plaintiff (often the Agencies or state attorneys general), will attempt to 
minimize the geographic area and quantity of products in the relevant market, 
while the defendant will argue just the opposite, largely in an effort to dilute 
the Agency-calculated post-merger market power.135  This is because 
generally, “firms with small market shares have little ability to influence the 
market price—that is exercise market power.”136  Conversely, firms with large 
market shares are capable of influencing market price.137  For example, a 
health insurance firm with a commanding share of the market—that is, many 
enrollees, would likely be able to unduly depress physician reimbursement 
rates—as physicians would have no choice but to acquiesce for fear of losing a 
substantial portion of business.  In a narrowly-defined market, however, 
because there are fewer firms comprising the relevant market, those firms will 
necessarily have larger market shares than in a more inclusive market.138  
When faced with accusations of antitrust violations, firms will relentlessly 
contend that they have small market shares so to avoid the potential restrictions 
of their market power.139  This is why antitrust cases often turn on relevant 
market delineation.140  With both parties pulling in different directions to 
define what is in and what is out of the relevant market, it is not difficult to 
imagine how the end result could strangely resemble “economic 
gerrymandering.”141  For the Guidelines to be truly meaningful, they must 
inform members of the bar how the Agencies will analyze proposed mergers 
 
 133. Gopal Das Varma, Comment Containing Suggested Revision to 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines Regarding the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Purposes of Market Definition 9 
(Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment 
No. 545095-00029, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/ 
index.shtm. 
 134. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 135. Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: 
Implications for Antitrust Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REV. 464, 464 (1983). 
 136. Levy, supra note 90, at 3. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Harris & Jorde, supra note 135.  Interestingly, firms will sometimes argue for narrowing 
the relevant geographic and product markets.  In a merger of A and B, A could argue for such a 
narrow market that would place A and B in separate and distinct relevant markets, thus since they 
are not competitors, the merger—in theory—could not amplify A’s market power.  See MILES, 
supra note 27, § 2:4. 
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and literally become the outline that Agency staff use in gathering information 
that will support their ultimate recommendations on a proposed merger’s likely 
competitive effects.142 
VI.  WHY HAS THE 1992 GUIDELINES MARKET DEFINITION FRAMEWORK BEEN 
SO DURABLE? 
The 1992 market definition methodology and the Guidelines as a whole 
have been so durable over the years because of, in a word: flexibility.143  The 
Guidelines are not over-specific insofar as they provide a flexible framework 
that can accommodate the substantial empirical inquiry that antitrust analysis 
inherently requires.144  It would be arduous and likely unworkable to posit a 
rigid, quantitative approach to market definition that could yield to the 
seemingly infinite amalgamation of idiosyncratic merger scenarios.145  After 
all, the Guidelines “do not, indeed cannot, explain the precise analysis to be 
undertaken in each investigation.”146 
Because the current market definition methodology remains a robust tool 
for initially screening for market concentration and determining whether firms 
fall within any safe harbors, I focus not on revamping market definition to 
accommodate health plan mergers under an exchange system, but on asking 
the right questions.147  These are questions that can be asked and answered by 
the Agencies with staffs of Ph.D. economists, but also by judges and attorneys 
 
 142. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 8–9. 
 143. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 17, at 2. 
 144. Id. at 2–3; see also Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12.  (“The current Guidelines have lasted 
longer than probably any of us expected, and that has conferred significant benefits on the 
agencies and the bar in terms of consistency and a greater meeting of the minds in terms of how 
to do most merger analysis.  As you go into more detail on the examples and specific models, you 
are going to make it far more difficult to come up with a durable document.”) (emphasis added). 
 145. See Gertner & Murphy, supra note 90, at 2 (“Virtually every market and therefore every 
merger investigation has idiosyncratic institutional, technological, environmental, and data 
availability features that determine the best approach to a competitive effects analysis.”). 
 146. Muris & Sayyed, supra note 17, at 3. 
 147. Feinstein, supra note 13 at 12. 
[T]he Guidelines and any associated commentary can serve a useful purpose for both 
courts and government agencies by specifying what are the right questions to ask, how 
might one answer those questions, and what are some safe harbors. 
. . . . 
. . . Although market definition is often just the first step in an analysis, it can be a useful 
one.  For example, if you define a market and then calculate market shares, there would 
be some cases where you could dismiss the possibility of anticompetitive harm from a 
merger immediately.  It is very valuable to firms to have some confidence that if they fall 
in a safe harbor that their case will be handled expeditiously and there won’t be any 
surprises. 
Id. at 9, 13 (emphasis added). 
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without advanced economics degrees.148  After all, much of the reason for the 
durability of market definition is that—though occasionally coarse—it is a 
very practical procedure that businesspeople can perform in an hour or two.149  
A non-economist businessperson can reason that if the widget market is 
comprised of companies A and B, it is highly concentrated and subject to 
Agency challenge, whereas if comprised of companies A, B, C, and D, the 
transaction would likely be cleared.150 
Undoubtedly, a market can be defined rigorously with the right 
quantitative information, but that information is usually unavailable.151  A 
leading antitrust economist notes that: 
[I]f one knows the structure of demand for a product and all its substitutes, 
knows the cost curves of firms that currently produce (or could produce) the 
product, and knows the game that describes the competitive environment (e.g., 
static Cournot, static Bertrand, dynamic trigger strategies), then one can write 
down a model whose equilibrium reflects the outcome of all these economic 
forces.152 
The realization of how demanding a task this is drives Agencies and 
practitioners to use proxies like market share (via market definition) to 
compute a firm’s market power.153  Without a tool like market definition to 
function as a screen for identifying mergers that will be unchallenged based on 
very low market shares, the benign mergers would be inefficiently burdened by 
a protracted investigation process and potentially jeopardized by increased 
compliance costs.154  The three health plan merger challenges to date: Aetna–
Prudential, UnitedHealth–PacifiCare, and UnitedHealth–Sierra, epitomize how 
 
 148. Feinstein, supra note 13, at 12 (“[The] Guidelines need to serve their constituencies—
agency and party lawyers, economists, business people, and the courts.”); see also Richard 
Brunell, Am. Antitrust Inst., Comments of the American Antitrust Institute 3–4 (Fed. Trade 
Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment No. 
545095-00023, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/ 
index.shtm (“It is especially important that the application of merger controls be explainable to 
the public in a way that resonates with common sense rather than the esoteric language of highly 
technical merger experts.”). 
 149. Feinstein, supra note 5, at 6. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Carlton, supra note 30, at 1. 
 152. Id. at 9. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Marius Schwartz & George Rozanski, Comments on Potential Revisions to the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 10 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines Review, Public Comment No. 545095-00019, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/comments/horizontalmergerguides/index.shtm.  In fact, an Agency Second Request can in 
itself cost a company millions and even jeopardize financing for the transaction.  See Leonard & 
Wu, supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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flexible and valuable the Guidelines’ market definition framework can be 
when dealing with complex and idiosyncratic horizontal mergers.155 
VII.  EXPLORING THE THREE AGENCY-CHALLENGED HEALTH PLAN MERGERS 
TO DATE 
Often claimed to be the result of rising health care costs, the health 
insurance industry has rampantly consolidated in recent years.156  From 1993 
to 2009, the DOJ has publicly investigated thirty-four major health mergers.157  
In 2004 and 2005 alone, there were a total of twenty-eight health insurance 
plan mergers—resulting in an approximate value of $54 billion.158  Of all the 
substantial health insurance mergers to date, the government has only formally 
challenged three of them.159  The first challenge to a proposed health plan 
merger—occurring after a string of sizeable, unchallenged mergers160—was 
Aetna Incorporated (“Aetna”) acquiring Prudential Insurance Company of 
America (“Prudential”).161  As will become apparent in this section, the use of 
metropolitan statistical areas (“MSAs”) or even zip codes have become widely 
accepted practices for more rigorously delineating geographic markets, as 
opposed to being constrained by choosing one particular state over another.162  
Since health insurance is administered on a state-by-state basis, it may be seem 
sensible to name a particular state as the relevant geographic market; however, 
because health insurance plans often concentrate their business within certain 
parts of the state, this could skew market concentrations—making the insurer’s 
market concentration appear erroneously low.163  These market concentrations 
are one reason why MSAs and zip codes provide for more rigorous market 
 
 155. See discussion infra Part VII. 
 156. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 18. 
 157. See id. at 6; see also infra Appendix A (chart depicting major health plan mergers). 
 158. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 18. 
 159. See Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31; PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31; 
Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31. 
 160. Robert E. Bloch, Is What’s Past Prologue?  The Evolution of Antitrust Enforcement 
Against Health Plans and Likely Enforcement Policies in the Obama Administration 2 (2009) (on 
file with author).  In 1998, Aetna Inc. acquired NYLCare for $1.05 billion, and earlier in 1996, 
Aetna acquired USHealthcare for nearly $9 billion.  Both mergers were consummated without 
significant opposition, as neither prompted a Hart-Scott-Rodino Second Request.  Id. 
 161. Complaint at 1, United States v. Aetna, Inc., No. 3-99 CV 1398-H (N.D. Tex. June 21, 
1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f2500/2501.pdf [hereinafter Aetna 
Complaint] (Aetna acquisition of Prudential). 
 162. Promulgated by the United States Department of Commerce, Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) are defined by the U.S. Census so that institutions and individuals gathering 
statistics on urban areas can use a common definition.  FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 85, app. C, at C-4. 
 163. Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 29, at 27. 
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delineation.164  The subsequent section will describe the three Agency-
challenged mergers and detail key points of Agency analysis—particularly 
how they pertain to market definition. 
A. Challenged Merger Between Aetna & Prudential 
On December 9, 1998, Aetna entered into an acquisition agreement with 
Prudential to purchase Prudential’s health insurance segment for $1 billion.165  
Under the terms of the agreement, Aetna would acquire a substantial share of 
Prudential’s assets pertaining to the issuing, selling, and administering of 
group Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) and HMO Point of Service 
(“HMO-POS”) plans.166  At that time, Aetna was the largest health insurance 
company in the United States, amassing in excess of $14 billion in revenues 
and totaling 15.8 million enrollees in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.167  Prudential was substantially smaller, coming in at ninth largest, 
amassing approximately $7.5 billion in revenue and totaling 4.9 million 
enrollees in twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia.168  After months 
of investigation—and after examining approximately forty different 
geographic markets—the DOJ alleged the product market to be the sale of 
HMO and HMO-POS plans.169  The relevant geographic markets were the 
Dallas/Fort Worth and Houston MSAs.170  In the Dallas/Fort Worth MSA, the 
DOJ alleged that Aetna currently had a 26% market share of the HMO and 
HMO-POS enrollees and that post-merger (i.e., once Prudential is acquired) 
would have a 42% market share of the same.171  In the Houston MSA, the DOJ 
alleged that Aetna—currently having a 44% market share—would have a 63% 
post-merger market share.172 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 3.  The $1 billion purchase price consisted of “$465 
million in cash, $500 million in three-year promissory notes, $15 million in cash payable under a 
Coinsurance Agreement, and $20 million in cash to be paid under [a] Risk-Sharing Agreement.”  
Id. 
 166. Id. at 3–4.  The primary difference between HMO and HMO-POS plans is that HMO 
members cannot see out-of-network providers (except extraordinary circumstances), whereas 
HMO-POS members can see out-of-network providers (albeit at greater cost).  Id. at 5.  There are 
also other smaller differences, like how HMOs require physical referrals, and HMO-POS plans 
allow for self-referral.  Id. 
 167. Id. at 1, 3; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 3. 
 168. Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 1, 3. 
 169. Id. at 2; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 3. 
 170. Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 2. 
 171. Id. at 7.  At the time, Prudential had a 16% market share of the Dallas/Fort Worth MSA 
for HMO and HMO-POS enrollees.  Id. 
 172. Id.  At the time, Prudential had a 19% market share of the Houston MSA for HMO and 
HMO-POS enrollees.  Id. 
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In the Complaint, the DOJ took a relatively innovative position on market 
definition.  Even though Aetna and Prudential both offered HMO, POS, and 
Preferred Provider Organization (“PPO”) plans, the DOJ attempted to define 
an HMO-only market (more specifically an HMO and HMO-POS market).173  
The DOJ alleged that HMOs were distinct from PPOs, because—unlike 
PPOs—HMOs differed in terms of “structure, price, licensing requirements, 
and benefit configurations.”174  Further, HMOs emphasized health 
maintenance, but restricted patients’ treatment options, precluded access to 
out-of-network providers, and required patients to obtain a referral from their 
primary care physician (i.e., gatekeeper) before visiting a specialist.175  The 
DOJ’s market definition position here was particularly novel because defining 
a circumscribed, HMO-only market starkly contrasted with numerous court 
decisions that—for the most part—defined relevant product markets to include 
all health-care financing.176 
The Aetna–Prudential Complaint and Competitive Impact Statement both 
failed to present any findings that quality or quantity of physician services or 
reimbursement rates would decline below competitive levels post-merger.177  
Additionally, there also was evidence that it would not be difficult for 
physicians to get on board with other health plans or persuade patients to do 
the same; this was primarily because many physicians already had contracts 
with alternative health plans and many employers (74% in Dallas) offered 
 
 173. Id. at 6.  The primary difference between HMO and PPO plans is the fact that HMO 
members are restricted to service from the in-network physicians, whereas PPO members can 
seek care outside of the network’s preferred provider list.  BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH 
LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 643 (Am. Casebook Ser., 6th ed. 2008). 
 174. Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 5. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id.; see, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 
1406, 1409–10 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1184 (1996) (reversing district court 
decision upholding a jury verdict based on an HMO-only product market on grounds HMOs 
compete with other types of health care financing); Doctor’s Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. 
Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 308 n.15 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Marshfield Clinic in finding that 
PPOs compete with HMOs and other managed care and non-managed care plans, “all of which 
are substitutable”); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993) 
(rejecting HMO-only market and recognizing market including all health insurance coverage; fact 
that HMOs are less expensive than other forms of health care financing does not mean HMOs 
constitute a separate market, because the difference in cost may be offset “by the limits placed on 
the patient’s choice of doctors”).  For a thorough listing of other relevant decisions, see Bloch, 
supra note 160, at 3 n.5, 4.  The DOJ also took a second novel position in alleging that the merger 
would result in Aetna obtaining monopsony power (i.e., Aetna would obtain buyer’s side market 
power with regard to purchasing physician’s services), but such is outside the scope of this 
article.  Aetna Complaint, supra note 161, at 8–11. 
 177. See Aetna Complaint, supra note 161; Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31; Bloch, 
supra note 160, at 5. 
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employees a choice of more than one plan.178  Despite this peculiar dearth of 
evidence, Aetna was required to divest its interests in the Houston and Dallas 
NYLCare operations to assuage the DOJ’s anticompetitive concerns.179  The 
divestitures included 260,000 HMO and HMO-POS enrollees in Houston, and 
another 167,000 of the same in Dallas; a grand total of nearly 430,000 covered 
lives.180 
B. Challenged Merger Between UnitedHealth Group & PacifiCare 
The second health plan merger challenge came in 2005, when the DOJ 
brought an enforcement action seeking to enjoin UnitedHealth Group 
(“UnitedHealth”) from acquiring PacifiCare’s health insurance-related 
assets.181  When the proposed merger was announced, UnitedHealth—one of 
the nation’s largest health insurers—had 55 million insured nationwide, and 
PacifiCare had approximately 13 million insured in assorted western states.182  
In 2004, at the time of the merger, UnitedHealth reported revenues in excess of 
$37 billion and PacifiCare reported revenues of $12.2 billion.183  The 
acquisition price for PacifiCare was just over $8 billion.184 
The DOJ challenged the proposed merger based on two allegations, the 
first being particularly germane to this article.  First, the DOJ alleged that the 
merger would “substantially lessen competition in the sale of commercial 
health insurance to small-group employers in Tucson, Arizona . . . .”185  In this 
Tucson market of commercial health insurers to small-group employers, 
UnitedHealth and PacifiCare are, respectively, the second and third largest in 
the Tucson MSA—UnitedHealth’s market share being approximately 16% and 
PacifiCare’s approximately 17%.186  The DOJ’s second anticompetitive 
allegation was that UnitedHealth would be in a post-merger position to 
exercise monopsony power over physicians insofar as it would be able to 
“unduly depress physician reimbursement rates . . . likely leading to a 
 
 178. Bloch, supra note 160, at 5–6. 
 179. Revised Final Judgment at 1–2, 6, United States v. Aetna, Inc., No. 3-99 CV 1398-H 
(N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f214700/214734.htm. 
 180. Id.; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 6. 
 181. Complaint at 1, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 1:05-cv-02436 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter PacifiCare Complaint], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ 
f213800/213815.pdf. 
 182. At the time of the proposed merger, PacifiCare had enrollees in Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.  Id.; see supra notes 85–89 and 
accompanying text, for discussion on monopsony power. 
 183. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 3. 
 184. PacifiCare Complaint, supra note 181, at 4. 
 185. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 4. 
 186. PacifiCare Complaint, supra note 181, at 7. 
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reduction in quantity or degradation in the quality of physician services.”187  In 
other words, because of UnitedHealth’s lucrative post-merger position, 
physicians would be unable to reject adverse contract terms because of the 
prospect of physicians losing a substantial portion of their client base.188 
The government, in defining the relevant product market to be the sale of 
commercial health insurance to small-group employers, is of particular 
significance because of how the commercial health insurance market was 
dichotomized into large and small group employers.189  In doing so, the 
government introduced several considerations that it believed sufficiently 
differentiated the two and justified the market circumscription: “Unlike larger-
group employers, small-group employers cannot feasibly self fund their 
employees’ health benefits.  They do not have a sufficient employee 
population across which they can spread financial risk . . . .”190  Because the 
small-group employers could not spread the financial risk, self funding was not 
a viable option for the employer.191  Therefore, because self funding was not a 
viable option for small-group employers, these employers—referring to the 
SSNIP analysis—“would not switch to self funding in sufficient numbers to 
make a small but significant increase in the price of fully-insured health plans 
to all small-group employers unprofitable.”192  Accordingly, the government 
delineated the product market as the sale of commercial health insurance to 
small-group employers.193 
Another consideration weighing in favor of the small-group employer 
delineation is the difference in the way in which commercial health insurance 
products are regulated, bought, and sold by large and small-group 
employers.194  Many states have regulations for commercial health insurance 
that are applicable only to small-group employers.195  Further, large employers 
have leverage and the ability to negotiate over price and contract terms, which 
often results in large employers paying different prices than others, whereas 
small groups are on more of a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and often have to accept 
or reject the insurer’s publicly advertised price.196 
The geographic market definition in UnitedHealth–PacifiCare was 
seemingly more straightforward than the product market definition.  The 
 
 187. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 8. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 4. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 4. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.  In Arizona, for example, a small group employer is one having two to fifty 
employees.  Id. 
 196. Id. at 4–5. 
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government—like in Aetna and Sierra—reasoned that because “[h]ealth 
insurance plan enrollees seek relationships with physicians and other health 
care professionals and institutions that are located in the metropolitan area in 
which they live and work,” the relevant geographic market was no broader 
than the Tucson, Arizona MSA.197  As a remedy, UnitedHealth was required to 
divest enough small-group contacts to make its market share roughly the same 
as if the proposed merger was never consummated.198  This came out to 54,517 
covered lives in Tucson, including at least 7,581 lives “covered by contracts 
with small-group employers . . . .”199  UnitedHealth was also required to divest 
either its largest contract with the University of Colorado (HMO contract), 
which included 6,066 members, or an equivalent number of enrollees under 
other contracts in the Boulder, Colorado area.200 
C. Challenged Merger between UnitedHealth & Sierra Health Services, Inc. 
UnitedHealth’s March 11, 2007 announcement that it was acquiring all 
shares of Sierra Health Services, Inc. (“Sierra”) led to the most recently 
challenged health plan merger.201  Sierra’s membership was concentrated in the 
Las Vegas area (specifically Clark and Nye counties).202  At the time of the 
transaction, UnitedHealth was the largest health insurer in the United States, 
with over 70 million enrollees nationwide and revenue for 2007 of $75 
billion.203  At the same time, Sierra was the largest health insurer in Nevada, 
with over 655,000 enrollees and revenue for 2007 of $1.9 billion.204  This 
substantial $2.6 billion transaction immediately attracted strong opposition, 
especially from the American Medical Association, claiming in a statement 
 
 197. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 5–6. 
 198. Id. at 11; Final Judgment, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., No. 1:05CV02436 
(D.D.C. May 23, 2006), at 5–9 [hereinafter PacifiCare Final Judgment]. 
 199. PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31 at 10–11; PacifiCare Final Judgment, supra 
note 198, at 4–5.  The figure 7,581 is the number of enrollees in the Tucson MSA that were 
covered under PacifiCare’s “small-group contracts” as of June 30, 2005.  PacifiCare Impact 
Statement, supra note 31, at 11; PacifiCare Final Judgment, supra note 198, at 4–5. 
 200.  PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31 at 12; PacifiCare Final Judgment, supra 
note 198, at 9.  As stated above, the geographic market definition for the DOJ’s first allegation 
was the Tucson MSA.  PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 5–6.  The reason 
divestitures were required in the Boulder MSA pertains to the DOJ’s second (monopsony) 
allegation (namely that post-merger, UnitedHealth would be able to depress physician 
reimbursement rates because physicians could not reject adverse contract terms out of the fear of 
losing substantial portions of business).  Id. at 8. 
 201. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 1. 
 202. Complaint at 1, United States v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-00322-ESH 
(D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Sierra Complaint], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
cases/f230400/230447.pdf. 
 203. Id. at 3. 
 204. Id. at 4. 
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that the acquisition would give UnitedHealth a commanding 94% combined 
market share for HMO products.205 
The DOJ challenged the transaction on the grounds that the proposed 
merger would yield anticompetitive effects in the sale of Medicare Advantage 
plans206 in Clark and western adjacent Nye County.207  Further, the DOJ 
predicted that UnitedHealth would possess a 94% market share post-merger.208  
UnitedHealth contended that any attempt to exercise market power (e.g., by 
attempting to raise price) for its Medicare Advantage plans would be 
impossible, as UnitedHealth’s attempt “would be thwarted by the federal 
government’s role as a power buyer of Medicare plans and regulator of 
Medicare Advantage bid terms, as well as by entry in the area by a number of 
Medicare Advantage plans for the coming year . . . .”209  These arguments were 
rejected by the DOJ as it contested the merger in a Medicare market.210 
Medicare Advantage plans were significantly involved, which affected the 
merger analysis—specifically the product market definition.  Because the 
benefits offered to seniors by Medicare Advantage plans over traditional 
Medicare were so lucrative, a sufficient number of Las Vegas area enrollees 
would not switch from Medicare Advantage to traditional Medicare in the 
event of a modest alteration to price or benefits, thereby, making a price 
 
 205. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7–8 (“Sierra accounts for approximately 60 
percent of Medicare Advantage enrollees in the Las Vegas area.  United accounts for 
approximately 34 percent.”); see Small Business Competition Policy: Are Markets Open for 
Entrepreneurs?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 110th Cong. 19, 75 n.13 (2008) 
(statement of William A. Hazel, Jr., M.D., Sec’y, Bd. of Trs., Am. Med. Ass’n); see also Bloch, 
supra note 160, at 11. 
 206. Medicare Advantage plans are offered by private insurance companies.  Sierra 
Complaint, supra note 202, at 5.  Congress, in establishing this program, intended that “vigorous 
competition among private Medicare Advantage insurers would lead insurers to offer seniors 
richer and more affordable benefits than traditional Medicare, provide a wider array of health-
insurance choices, and be more responsive to the demands of seniors.”  Id. at 2.  In fact, most 
successful Medicare Advantage Plans achieve those goals.  Id. at 5. 
 207. Id. at 1; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 12. 
 208. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 4.  Although the DOJ did not officially pursue 
a more narrow product market definition, they apparently toyed with the idea of further narrowing 
the product market to Medicare Advantage coordinated-care plans (MA-HMO and MA-PPO), 
which in this case would have given UnitedHealth a 99% post-merger market share in the same 
geographic market.  Id. at 5. 
 209. Bloch, supra note 160, at 12.  Mr. Bloch was a lead attorney involved in the merger 
transaction.  See Sierra Complaint, supra note 202, at 11.  “Medicare Advantage Plans consist of 
Medicare Advantage health maintenance organization (“MA-HMO”) plans, Medicare Advantage 
preferred provider organization (“MA-PPO”) plans, and Medicare Advantage Private Fee-for-
Service (“MA-PFFS”) plans.”  Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 1–2. 
 210. Bloch, supra note 160, at 12; see also Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 1. 
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increase or reduction in benefits unprofitable.211  Moreover, as Medicare 
Advantage plans offered richer benefits over traditional Medicare (e.g., lower 
co-payments, lower co-insurance, caps on total yearly out-of-pocket costs, 
prescription drug coverage, vision coverage, health club memberships, etc.), 
Medicare Advantage plans exclusively comprised Sierra’s relevant product 
market.212 
Sierra’s geographic market definition exercise was more straightforward.  
Because Medicare-eligible residents in Clark and Nye counties are only able to 
enroll in CMS-approved Medicare Advantage plans for the county in which 
they reside, enrollees were precluded from shopping around in other 
geographic areas for coverage.213  Accordingly, the relevant geographic market 
was found to be Clark and Nye counties within the Las Vegas area.214 
The DOJ found that in the product market consisting solely of Medicare 
Advantage plans, the merged UnitedHealth–Sierra would account for a 94% of 
Las Vegas’s total Medicare Advantage enrollment, which drew approximately 
$840 million in annual commerce.215  The DOJ surprisingly did not allege any 
monopsony suspicions, nor did it introduce the commercial insurance market 
into the equation as in Aetna and PacifiCare (this was solely a Medicare 
market).216  As a remedy, UnitedHealth was required to divest its Medicare 
Advantage line of business in the Las Vegas area (which covered 
approximately 25,000 individual Medicare Advantage beneficiaries) to an 
“approved acquirer.”217  The idea was that by divesting its Las Vegas line of 
business to an approved acquirer, anticompetitive effects would be eliminated 
because the divested business would presumably be sold to an entity that could 
vigorously and perpetually compete with the merged UnitedHealth-Sierra.218  
Notably, despite the considerable divestiture, UnitedHealth was able to retain 
Sierra’s 49,500 members in Las Vegas.219 
 
 211. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7.  The lucrative benefits included lower co-
payments, lower co-insurance, caps on total yearly out-of-pocket costs, prescription drug 
coverage, vision coverage, and health club memberships, among others.  Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Sierra Complaint, supra note 202, at 2. 
 216. Bloch, supra note 160, at 12. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 9–10. 
 219. Sierra Complaint, supra note 202, at 4; see also Bloch, supra note 160, at 12 (detailing 
other specifics of the transaction and the consent decree). 
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D. What Can Be Learned from the Aetna, PacifiCare, & Sierra Health Plan 
Mergers? 
The three Agency-challenged health plan mergers signal that courts are 
very hesitant to broadly define the relevant market.  Concerning geographic 
markets—all three cases utilized one or two MSAs for geographic market 
definition: Aetna’s geographic market was defined as the Dallas and Houston 
MSAs, PacifiCare’s market was limited to the Tucson MSA, and Sierra’s 
consisted of only two counties (Clark and Nye) within Las Vegas area.220  In 
the same vein, concerning product market definition—Aetna was limited to 
HMO and HMO-POS plans, PacifiCare was limited to commercial insurance 
to small employers, and Sierra was limited to Medicare Advantage plans.221  
This portends that under the PPACA’s health care exchange system, courts—
and especially the Agencies—will likely seek to circumscribe and constrict the 
relevant markets as much as possible. 
VIII.  INVESTIGATING & ANALYZING PPACA 
A. Background of the Patient Protection and Affordable Coverage Act of 
2010 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), was 
signed into law by President Obama on March 23, 2010 and amended seven 
days later by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA).222  
This ten-titled bill is a comprehensive overhaul of the U.S. health care system, 
with provisions aiming for broad-spectrum improvements in everything from 
health care coverage to financing to delivery.223  In addition to obligating all 
applicable individuals224 to purchase and maintain acceptable health insurance, 
 
 220. Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 2; PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 
31, at 3; Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7. 
 221. Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 2; PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 
31, at 4; Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7. 
 222. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 223. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3001, 124 Stat. 119, 353 (“Transforming the Health 
Care Delivery System”), § 1001, 124 Stat. at 131 (“Improving Coverage”), § 1413, 124 Stat. at 
233 (“Health Subsidy Programs”).  There are a few areas within health care that will be relatively 
unscathed by the PPACA, including professional licensure, malpractice, and much of the 
bioethics field.  FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 1. 
 224. There are several exempted groups from this individual mandate, including American 
Indians, members of certain religious sects or ministries that object to health insurance, and those 
experiencing financial hardship.  42 U.S.C. § 18081(b)(5)(A)–(B) (West Supp. 2010).  The brunt 
of the individual insurance mandate will affect self-employed persons whose income is well 
above the median.  FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 74. 
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PPACA incentivizes (and disincentivizes) insurers and health care providers to 
deliver care as efficiently and effectively as possible.225 
Perhaps the most probative PPACA Title for purposes of this article is 
Title I, which addresses the initiative for patching up what has become a 
fragmented health insurance industry.226  Title I contains some provisions that 
have already been enacted at the time of this writing, as well as plenty of 
others to unfurl in years to come.227  Title I not only establishes the American 
Health Benefit Exchanges and SHOP Exchanges,228 but also includes—among 
a litany of other reforms—the mandate that applicable individuals purchase 
and/or maintain qualifying health insurance or face monetary penalties,229 to 
provide health insurance subsidies for qualifying individuals,230 and attempt to 
end or significantly mitigate the deceptive and exclusionary practices of health 
insurers.231 
 
 225. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (West Supp. 2010).  Any person is eligible to participate in the 
individual exchange if that person lives in the state in which the particular exchange operates, is 
not incarcerated (unless pending disposition of charges), and is a citizen or lawful alien 
reasonably expecting to remain as such for the entire enrollment period.  42 U.S.C. § 18032(f). 
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 18001; see also Thomas L. Greaney, Competition Policy and Organizational 
Policy in Health Care, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 217, 226–27 (2009) (discussing fragmentation arising 
out of health care financing). 
 227. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-14 (extension of dependent health coverage until child 
reaches age twenty-six); id. § 18001(a)  (Secretary to establish a temporary high risk health 
insurance pool program within six months of PPACA’s enactment).  But see id. § 18031(b)(1)  
(health insurance exchanges to begin on January 1, 2014). 
 228. Id. § 18031(a).  “American Health Benefit Exchange” refers to health insurance 
exchanges for individuals, and will hereinafter be referred to as simply “exchanges.”  Id.  Further, 
“SHOP Exchange” refers to PPACA’s Small Business Health Options Program, which facilitates 
the sale of qualified health insurance for small group employers, and will hereinafter be referred 
to as “SHOP Exchange.”  Id. § 18031(a)(5), (b)(1)(B).  A state may elect to merge the two 
exchanges if it has adequate resources to do reasonably do so.  Id. § 18031(b)(2). 
 229. Id. § 18091.  In 2016, when fully phased in, individuals without acceptable coverage will 
be subject to tax penalties of the greater of $695 per year for each adult ($2,085 per family), or a 
2.5% share of the household’s income.  KFF CHART, supra note 19, at 1.  It is important to note 
that PPACA does not require any individual to terminate their current (group plan or other) 
coverage and participate in the health insurance exchange (“current” meaning that the individual 
was enrolled at the time of PPACA’s enactment).  42 U.S.C. § 18011(a).  Interestingly, however, 
there is one group which is mandated by PPACA to purchase insurance through the exchanges: 
members of Congress and Congressional staff.  Id. § 18032(d). 
 230. 42 U.S.C. § 18083(a).  For a great discussion on the various subsidies and the terms for 
qualifying for varying amounts, see FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 65–68. 
 231. These deceptive practices include but are certainly not limited to: underwriting based on 
health status, excluding particular preexisting conditions, and cancelling or rescinding coverage 
once a claim is made based on the finding of a trivial and unrelated omission in the individual’s 
health insurance application.  See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3.  PPACA now requires the omission to be 
“an act or practice that constitutes fraud or [] an intentional misrepresentation of material fact as 
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The idea behind the health insurance exchanges is to increase access to 
health insurance by making it affordable; the affordability—in theory—will be 
realized by promoting vigorous competition—solely on price—among health 
insurance companies.232  Through the exchanges, the sale of qualifying health 
insurance will be facilitated by how individuals and small group employers can 
browse available coverage options in easy to compare, apples-to-apples format, 
and select what is most suitable.233  PPACA will allow individuals and small 
businesses with up to 100 employees to purchase health coverage and 
businesses with more than 100 employees to purchase coverage starting in 
2017.234  Small employers can be grandfathered into the small group exchange, 
as long as the small group employer in the exchange expands, it can continue 
to be treated as a small group employer (even if it would technically be a 
classified as a large group employer), as long as it remains in the exchange.235  
Funding for these health insurance marketplaces will not be borne entirely by 
the states—at least not until 2015—as the federal government will temporarily 
(2011 to 2015) provide “grants” to eligible states for use in implementing and 
maintaining the operability of their exchanges.236  The states’ health insurance 
exchanges must be entirely self-sustaining by January 1, 2015.237 
At this writing, PPACA’s logistics for health insurance exchanges are 
relatively articulated, but there is still much that is to be sorted out by 
administrators and regulators.238  In fact, states are not even required to 
participate in the exchanges.239  If a state chooses not to participate, one of two 
 
prohibited by the terms of the plan or coverage.”  Id. § 300gg-12.  “Such plan or coverage may 
not be cancelled except with prior notice to the enrollee, . . .”  Id. 
 232. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INSURANCE FACT SHEET, supra note 37. 
 233. FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 114–15. 
 234. 42 U.S.C. § 18032(f)(2)(B).  Large group employers are those “who employed an 
average of at least 101 employees on business days during the preceding calendar year and who 
employs at least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year.”  Id. § 18024(b)(1).  Small group 
employers are those “who employed an average of at least 1 but not more than 100 employees on 
business days during the preceding calendar year and who employs at least 1 employee on the 
first day of the plan year.”  Id. § 18024(b)(2).  For plans beginning before January 1, 2016 states 
can opt to substitute “51 employees” for “101 employees” and “50 employees” for “100 
employees.”  Id. § 18024(b)(3).  This seems to be a provision that states can use as a means of 
avoiding overburdening the state exchange while it is still in its infancy (hence why after January 
2016—when the exchanges are expected to be at full-strength—this provision of employee 
substitution no longer applies). 
 235. Id. § 18024(d). 
 236. Id. § 18031(a)(2). 
 237. Id. § 18031(d)(5) (“[T]he State shall ensure that such Exchange is self-sustaining 
beginning on January 1, 2015, including allowing the Exchange to charge assessments or user 
fees to participating health insurance issuers, or to otherwise generate funding, to support its 
operations.”). 
 238. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 19, at 4. 
 239. 42 U.S.C. § 18052. 
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things will happen.  First, the state could seek a “waiver based on state 
innovation” for plan years beginning on or after January 1, 2017, meaning that 
a state could implement a health insurance model entirely different from an 
exchange, as long as the state’s new schematic complies with the litany of 
provisions outlined in PPACA Section 18052(a).240  If a state proceeds with 
this waiver, the state’s coverage must be “at least as comprehensive” as the 
exchange’s Qualified Health Plan (QHP) coverage, not increase the federal 
deficit, provide coverage to at least as many residents, and have premiums and 
cost sharing at least as low and to at least as many residents, respectively.241  
Alternatively, if a state does not seek a waiver, but still resists setting up an 
exchange, the HHS Secretary shall—directly or through a non-profit entity—
establish an exchange in the non-electing state.242  This is a strong disincentive 
against resisting the exchange paradigm, as an HHS-arranged insurance 
exchange would likely afford state governors much less control over how the 
exchange operates and how payors are reimbursed. 
If a state is amenable to establishing and maintaining an exchange, PPACA 
will utilize the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to contract with 
insurers, each of which must offer at least two multi-state plans in any 
exchange in which they participate.243  Under PPACA, there does not seem to 
be a limit to how many states can collectively establish an exchange.  Instead, 
it appears that regional exchanges are legitimate as long as states can agree and 
the collaboration does not violate any state laws.244  In fact, individual states 
are also permitted to form their own regional exchanges (comprised of sub-
exchanges), and states may have more than one sub-exchange operate in a 
single state—provided each serves a distinct geographic area.245  Insurance 
behemoths like Blue Cross Blue Shield could be prominent throughout these 
multi-state exchanges, as PPACA explicitly allows the OPM Director to 
contract with a group of insurers “affiliated either by common ownership and 
 
 240. Id. § 18052(a). 
 241. Id. § 18052(b).  QHPs are discussed infra, notes 248–53 and accompanying text. 
 242.  42 U.S.C. § 18041 (a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A).  According to PPACA, if the HHS Secretary 
determines on or before January 1, 2013 that a state will not be ready to launch a fully operational 
exchange by January 1, 2014, the HHS Secretary shall take necessary measures to implement an 
exchange.  Id. § 18041(c)(1). 
 243. Id. § 18054(a)(1).   Though OPM also administers the Federal Employees Health Benefit 
Program (FEHBP), multi-state exchange plans will be administered separately and will have a 
distinct risk pool.  Id. § 18054 (g)(5). 
 244. Id. § 18031(f). 
 245. Id. § 18031(f)(2)(B).   The Act also requires “the area served by each Exchange is at 
least as large as a rating area described in section 300gg(a) of this title.”  Id.  What § 300gg(a) 
adds with regard to rating area is namely how “each State shall establish 1 or more rating areas 
within that State” and the “Secretary shall review [for adequacy] the rating areas established by 
each State.”  Id. § 300gg(a)(2)(A).  If the state’s rating fails here, the Secretary has the power to 
establish the state’s rating areas.  Id. § 300gg(a)(2)(B). 
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control or by the common use of a nationally licensed service mark.”246  Each 
plan must offer a benefits package that is uniform in each state in which the 
insurer offers coverage through the exchange, and the multistate exchanges 
must be state-established and administered by a governmental agency or non-
profit entity.247 
Not all health insurance plans will be allowed to participate in the health 
insurance exchanges; the only plans that may be offered through exchanges are 
“qualified health plans” (QHPs).248  A qualified health plan indicates that the 
plan has satisfied various requirements to assure legitimacy.249 A qualified 
health plan must (A) be certified by the exchange in which it seeks to 
operate;250 (B) provide an “essential health benefits package”; and (C) be 
offered by a qualifying health insurer.251  A qualifying health insurer is one 
that: (1) is in good standing and licensed in the state(s) where the Exchange 
operates; (2) agrees to offer—in each exchange in which it operates—at least 
one gold-level and one silver-level plan; (3) agrees to charge the same 
premium for each QHP regardless of whether the QHP is offered through the 
Exchange or sold directly to the insured; and (4) complies with Section 
18031(d) requirements promulgated by the Secretary and any other 
requirements established by an Exchange.252  It is worthy of note that, subject 
to few exceptions, all of the “qualified” plans available in the Exchanges and 
 
 246. Id. § 18054(a)(1). 
 247. 42 U.S.C. § 18054(a)(2)–(4); see also KFF CHART, supra note 19, at 4 (Each state must 
have, at least one plan being offered by a non-profit entity and at least one plan that does not 
provide coverage for abortions beyond those permitted by federal law (e.g., cases of rape and 
incest)). 
 248. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)(A). 
 249. Id. § 18021. 
 250. Id. § 18031(e)(1).  A QHP may become certified by meeting certification requirements 
“as promulgated by the Secretary” and if “the Exchange determines that making available such 
health plan through such Exchange is in the interests of qualified individuals and qualified 
employers in the State or States in which such Exchange operates . . . .”  Id. § 18031(e)(1). 
 251. Id. § 18021(a).  An “essential health benefits package”—to be considered such—must 
include at least the following general categories of services and cover at least 60% of the actuarial 
value of the covered benefits: “Ambulatory patient services[;] [e]mergency services[;] 
[h]ospitalization[;] [m]aternity and newborn care[;] [m]ental health and substance use disorder 
services, including behavioral health treatment[;]  [p]rescription drugs[;] [r]ehabilitative and 
habilitative services and devices[;] [l]aboratory services[;] [p]reventative and wellness services 
and chronic disease management[; and] [p]ediatric services, including oral and vision care.”  Id. 
§§ 18022(b)(1)(A)–(J), (d)(1).  The QHP must also limit cost-sharing to the current HSA limits, 
which in 2010 were $5,950 for an individual and $11,900 for a family.  Id. § 18022(c)(1)(A); 
KFF CHART, supra note 19, at 6. 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(C). 
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private small group and individual markets must, at a minimum, offer the 
essential benefits package.253 
PPACA has four categories of tiered benefits packages, each with 
incrementally increasing coverage, and a separate catastrophic plan.254  The 
catastrophic plan—only available in the individual market—is available to 
those who have not reached the age of thirty or to those exempted from 
PPACA’s mandate to purchase acceptable coverage.255  PPACA’s most basic 
plan—the bronze plan—represents the minimum acceptable coverage; it 
provides the essential health benefits package, and it covers 60% of the plan’s 
benefit costs, with an out-of-pocket limit equal to the current Health Savings 
Account (HSA) limit.256  The essential health benefits package and out-of-
pocket limits apply to all of PPACA’s tiered plans.257  The silver plan covers 
70% of the plan’s actuarial benefit costs; the gold plan covers 80% of the 
plan’s actuarial benefit costs; and the platinum plan covers 90% of the plan’s 
actuarial benefit costs—again, all with the essential benefits package and HSA 
out-of-pocket limits.258  The aforementioned out-of-pocket limits are not static, 
but are reduced for those with incomes between 100% to 400% of the Federal 
Poverty Level (“FPL”).259  PPACA strongly incentivizes health insurers within 
the Exchange strictly to offer the essential health benefits package, because if 
states impose mandated additional benefits beyond the essential health benefits 
package, they must subsidize—by making payments to the health plan on the 
individual’s behalf or by paying the individual directly—to defray the 
incremental premium cost that is attributable to the state’s additional mandated 
benefits.260  Additionally, regarding the age rating requirements of multi-state 
Exchange plans, if one state’s rating requirement is lower than 3:1, that 
particular state may require other multi-state plans functioning in that state to 
 
 253. KFF CHART, supra note 19, at 6.  This requirement does not apply to grandfathered 
employer-sponsored or individual plans.  Id. 
 254. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1), (e). 
 255. Id. § 18022(e).  The catastrophic plan includes coverage set at the 2010 HSA limits of 
$5,950 for an individual and $11,900 for a family.  KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 5.  Under this 
plan, prevention benefits and coverage for three primary care visits would be exempt from the 
deductible.  Id. 
 256. Id. § 18022(d)(1)(A); see also KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 5 (stating that the HSA limit 
in 2010 is $5,950 for individuals and $11,900 for families). 
 257. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(2)(A); see also KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 5. 
 258. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1)(B–D). 
 259. Id. § 18071(b) (2006); see KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 5.  For incomes between 100% 
to 200% FPL, the HSA limit is reduced by one-third ($1,983/individual and $3,967/family); for 
incomes between 200% to 300% FPL, the HSA limit is reduced by one-half ($2,975/individual 
and $5,950/family); for incomes between 300% to 400% FPL, the HSA limit is reduced by two-
thirds ($3,987/individual and $7,973/family).  These out-of-pocket reductions do not increase the 
plan’s actuarial value, as they are applied within the plan’s actuarial limits.  Id. 
 260. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
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raise their rating requirements to comply with the state’s “more protective age 
rating rules.”261 
IX.  DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET FOR HEALTH PLAN MERGERS UNDER 
PPACA 
With health insurance consolidation still continuing at an “alarming pace,” 
should PPACA survive various states’ lawsuits, it will not be long before 
agencies, courts, and state attorneys general begin thinking about the antitrust 
ramifications with health insurance Exchanges now in the mix.262  This section 
walks through how the Agencies could sensibly proceed through this 
ambiguous and thorny process, with the 1992 Guidelines serving as the 
analytical underpinning, the three above-analyzed health plan mergers as 
reference points, and the “practical” market definition discussion to orient the 
reader. 
It is important to reiterate the Agencies’ penchant for narrowly defining the 
relevant geographic and product markets.  Despite the fact that employers have 
always been able to search nationwide for health insurance, the Antitrust 
Division—in all three cases challenging health plan mergers—alleged a 
relevant geographic market consisting of merely localities or MSAs.263  The 
prominent and recurring rationale is that competition among plans springs 
from the plans’ local provider networks; therefore, if the merged company 
attempted to increase price, enough employers would not switch and insure 
with more distant provider networks so as to render the price increase 
unprofitable.264  The same market circumscription is present in the three 
previously discussed product markets, as the DOJ narrowed the product market 
to HMO and HMO-POS plans in Aetna, commercial insurance to small-group 
employers in PacifiCare, and Medicare Advantage plans in Sierra.265  There is 
 
 261. Id. § 18054(c)(5); KFF Chart, supra note 19, at 4. 
 262. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 5 (“[Health plan consolidation] still continues at 
an alarming pace with two particularly large and problematic consolidations coming under DOJ 
review in 2008.”).  The “large and problematic” mergers being referenced are United-Sierra and 
Independence Blue Cross-Highmark.  Id. at 6. 
 263. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 34, at 149–50 (stating that the Antitrust 
Division alleged geographic markets consisting of the Dallas and Houston MSAs in its challenge 
of Aetna’s acquisition of Prudential, the Tucson MSA in its challenge of United Healthcare’s 
acquisition of PacifiCare, and the Las Vegas area in its challenge of United Healthcare’s 
acquisition of Sierra Health Services). 
 264. Id. at 160; see Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7–8 (“[M]anaged care 
companies establish provider networks in the areas where employees work and live, and they 
compete on the basis of these local provider networks” such that “a small but significant increase 
in the price of HMO and HMO-POS plans would not cause a sufficient number of customers to 
switch to health plans outside of these regions to make such a price increase unprofitable.”). 
 265. Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 2; PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 
31, at 1–2; Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 1. 
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nothing indicating that enforcement agencies will depart from this tendency to 
narrowly define markets in a post-PPACA regime. 
A. Defining the Relevant Geographic Market Under PPACA 
As articulated above, PPACA will involve states establishing numerous 
state-operated health insurance Exchanges.266  Concerning the relevant 
geographic market definition under this paradigm, at first blush it would seem 
sensible to delineate and aggregate the states or regions in which the merged 
insurance company would be participating post-merger.  This would not be 
difficult, because according to PPACA, each intra-state Exchange would be 
operating in a distinct geographic area.267  Perhaps an example would be 
illuminating.  If, within a state, Exchange One operates in geographic market 
A1 and Exchange Two operates in geographic market A2, then the post-merger 
geographic market could be calculated by aggregating the sum of regions or 
MSAs that each served: A1 + A2 = GMKT.268  This approach is consistent with 
the Sierra rationale, because in Sierra the Medicare-eligible residents in the 
Las Vegas area could only enroll in the Medicare Advantage plans for the 
county in which they live—as a result, enrollees could not turn elsewhere for 
the Medicare Advantage plans.269  According to PPACA, individuals could 
purchase insurance in an Exchange, which would have the ability to operate 
across state lines (i.e., regional Exchanges).270  However, the DOJ has made it 
clear that enrollees do not wish to cross state lines to see their doctor—they 
want a local provider network; because the DOJ has defined the geographic 
market precisely this way in the previous three health plan mergers, this pulls 
heavily in favor of the Agencies continuing to restrict and hone the geographic 
market down to the local MSAs.271  For this reason, it seems that the most 
sensible approach would be the relevant geographic market as the Agencies 
have done in the past, namely “no larger than the local areas within which 
HMO and HMO-POS enrollees demand access to providers.”272  Applying this 
methodology to PPACA, Exchanges would result in the geographic market 
being the local areas in which enrollees in health Exchange “X” would 
 
 266. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1) (West Supp. 2010). 
 267. Id. § 18031(f)(2)(A). 
 268. Under this approach, it would be wise to use either geographic regions (e.g., states) or 
MSAs, but not both—as this could create confusion with overlapping markets. 
 269. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7 (“Because Medicare-eligible residents in the 
Las Vegas area cannot purchase substitute Medicare Advantage plans sold in other geographic 
areas, the Las Vegas area is a relevant geographic market . . . .”). 
 270. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(f)(1). 
 271. See PacifiCare Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 5 (“Health insurance plan enrollees 
seek relationships with physicians and other health care professionals and institutions that are 
located in the metropolitan area in which they live and work.”). 
 272. Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7–8. 
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demand access to providers.273  Ascertaining the provider demand could be 
accomplished by performing resident surveys, a technique stated in the 
Commentary to be very useful and frequently utilized.274 
B. Defining the Relevant Product Market Under PPACA 
The nature of the PPACA Exchanges and the product offerings of four 
discrete and differentiated plans—bronze, silver, gold, and platinum—greatly 
simplifies the process of the relevant product market.  A sensible way to define 
the relevant product market would be to identify and aggregate which 
insurance plans the merged entity would provide post-merger, and define the 
market no broader than that.275  If post-merger the merged entity would be 
offering bronze, silver, and gold plans, then the sale of bronze, silver, and gold 
plans could comprise the relevant product market in a line of commerce. 
Defining the market in this way is prudent, as the Exchange’s strict 
stipulation that insurers offer among four discrete plans would have a de facto 
effect of necessarily grouping plans that have in common significant attributes 
that cannot be found in products outside that class.276  For example, the 
platinum plan has benefits (90% benefit coverage) that cannot be found in the 
gold plan (80% benefit coverage), and the same for the gold plan compared to 
the silver (70% benefit coverage), and silver to bronze (60% benefit 
coverage).277  In Aetna parlance, this is to say that these plans are “distinct 
products, meeting different needs and appealing to different types of 
enrollees.”278  Because these plans are structured to meet different needs and 
budgets, it would be sensible for each to comprise their own relevant market. 
This solution is also grounded in the Sierra rationale.  In Sierra, the DOJ 
did not include traditional Medicare in the same market as Medicare 
Advantage plans because, “[d]ue in large part to the lower out-of-pocket costs 
 
 273. Here, “X” insurance plan is referring to whatever the product market is defined as in 
terms of the platinum, gold, silver, and bronze plans. 
 274. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 9. 
 275. An example of how the market could be defined more broadly would be to include the 
full range of Exchange plans without regard to what was going to be sold by the merged entity.  
An even broader definition would be delineating all commercial—Exchange and non-Exchange-
based—insurance plans that offer the same or substantially similar benefits offered under the 
multi-state Exchange plan. 
 276. See Gopal Das Varma, Will Use of the Upward Pricing Pressure Test Lead to an 
Increase in the Level of Merger Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Fall 2009, at 27, 28 (“[T]he manner in 
which relevant markets are defined in practice often revolves around identifying a class of 
products (including those of the merging firms) that have in common certain attributes that are 
sufficiently valued by their consumers and that cannot be found in products outside of the class.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 277. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1) (West Supp. 2010). 
 278. See Aetna Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 7 (discussing market definition and why 
PPO plans are not in the same product market as HMO and HMO-POS plans). 
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and richer benefits that many Medicare Advantage plans offer seniors over 
traditional Medicare, seniors in the Las Vegas area would not likely switch 
away from Medicare Advantage plans to traditional Medicare . . . .”279  This 
could be analogized to the tiered-benefits of the PPACA’s Exchange system 
insofar as each plan offers—in Sierra terms—“lower out-of-pocket costs” and 
“richer benefits” than the next best plan.280  Like Medicare Advantage and 
traditional Medicare, not only do the gold and silver plans differ by cost and 
benefit configuration, but they are also not seen as adequate substitutes for one 
another.281  In SSNIP terms—like Sierra—because of the significant variation 
in the level of benefits between different plan tiers, enrollees would not switch 
plans in the event of a small but significant increase in price so as to render the 
increase unprofitable for the hypothetical monopolist.282  Because the increase 
would be profitable, the market need not be broadened beyond the aggregate of 
the benefit plans to be offered post-merger. 
Now, in the event that the health benefits plans within the insurance 
Exchange were lumped into the same market as commercial insurance plans, 
there is also a sensible approach.  Here, the product market could be defined to 
include all plans that meet a certain minimum diversion ratio threshold (which 
the Agencies could supplement into the Horizontal Merger Guidelines) with 
respect to four insurance plans (bronze to platinum).283  In doing this, 
insurance plans sharing more common attributes would have a higher diversion 
ratio, which would be indicative of which plans are seen as substitutes in the 
buyers’ eyes.284  This is appropriate since the market definition exercise seeks 
to ascertain whether—in the event of a hypothetical price increase—buyers 
could turn to other products and/or geographic areas so as to make that price 
increase unprofitable. 
 
 279. Sierra Impact Statement, supra note 31, at 4–5. 
 280. See 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1) (providing that each plan offers 10% more benefit coverage 
than the next best plan). 
 281. Medicare Advantage benefits include “lower co-payments, lower co-insurance, caps on 
total yearly out-of-pocket costs, prescription drug coverage, vision coverage, health club 
memberships, and other benefits that traditional Medicare does not cover.”  Sierra Impact 
Statement, supra note 31, at 7. 
 282. See id. 
 283. See Das Varma, supra note 276, at 29 (stating that defining a product’s market “to 
include all products that have a certain minimum diversion ratio with respect to that product” is 
“based on the idea that products with fewer attributes in common with the product in question 
would both have a lower diversion ratio and be likely to be dropped from the market definition by 
the practical approach”). 
 284. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
If the necessarily prospective nature of merger analysis was not complex 
enough, this market definition discussion is an especially onerous exercise, as 
PPACA is still in its infancy, and a considerable amount of the bill is yet to 
unfurl or even be fully interpreted by scholarly commentators. 
Articulating a bright-line rule for how the markets for health plan mergers 
are to be defined would be exceptionally precarious, seeing how so much of 
the criticism aimed toward the Guidelines includes their use of bright-line 
rules, reliance on structural presumptions, and attempts at over-specificity.285  
Admittedly, market definition is only a basic indicator of whether a merger 
will have anticompetitive effects, but its simplicity is nevertheless a pivotal 
part of its practicality.  After all, with the Agencies’ modest resources, an 
extensive quantitative analysis would still not be feasible in the narrowly 
allotted Hart-Scott-Rodino time frame.286 
A key mode of analysis that needs to be kept it mind when defining the 
relevant geographic and product markets of health plan mergers under an 
Exchange system is identifying the right questions to ask, rather than trying to 
concoct an elaborate framework suited to the particular delivery system, as that 
would analytically circumscribe the Guidelines’ acclaimed adaptability to 
idiosyncratic mergers.287  While the proffered methodology is by no means the 
only way that the relevant geographic and product markets may be defined 
under PPACA, this is nevertheless one that is rooted in the previous three 
challenged health plan mergers and comports with common sense and industry 
structure.  This undoubtedly is not the extent of the evidence that the Agencies 
consider when delineating potentially scores of regional and local markets, as 
the Agencies’ Commentary explicitly states that they rely on customer 
interviews and other data for market definition information.288 
In observing how the 2006 Commentary followed the Agencies’ 2004 
Merger Enforcement Workshop, it will be very interesting to see if the 
Agencies release additional Guidelines Commentary following the current 
merger workshops conducted in 2010, and if so, how they plan to deal with the 
 
 285. See Feinstein, supra note 6, at 5 (“The bright line rules and presumptions the agencies 
may find helpful in court, and that can provide some guidance to parties contemplating a 
merger—may not actually reflect the nuanced manner in which the agencies actually conduct a 
merger review.”); Gertner & Murphy, supra note 90, at 2 (“The Guidelines’ weaknesses reflect 
the attempt to be too detailed on some issues, while providing little if any guidance on others.”). 
 286. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 2. 
 287. See Feinstein, supra note 13, at 7. 
 288. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY, supra note 10, at 9 
(“The Agencies routinely solicit information from customers regarding their product and supplier 
selections.  In selecting their suppliers, customers typically evaluate the alternatives available to 
them and can often provide the Agencies with information on their functional needs as well as on 
the cost and availability of substitutes.”). 
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amorphous market definition concepts inherent in market definition within a 
health insurance Exchange system. 
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APPENDIX A289 
DATE  MAJOR HEALTH PLAN MERGERS  
1993  Anthem – Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Kentucky  
1995  Anthem – Community Mutual (a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan in 
Ohio) 
United – MetraHealth 
United – PHP of Missouri  
1996  WellPoint – Group Life and Health (Subsidiary of Mass Mutual 
Life) 
United – PHP of North Carolina 
Aetna – US Healthcare  
1997  Anthem – Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Connecticut  
1998  United – Humana (abandoned for financial reasons) 
United – PHP of Texas 
Blue Cross Illinois – Blue Cross Texas (formed HCSC) 
Aetna – NYL Care  
1999  Anthem – Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New Hampshire 
Anthem – Blue Cross/ Blue Shield of Colorado and Nevada 
Aetna – Prudential 
Yellowstone Community Health Plan – BCBS of Montana  
2000  Anthem – Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine 
WellPoint – Rush Prudential Health Plans of Illinois  
2001  HCSC – Blue Cross New Mexico 
WellPoint – Cerulean Companies Inc. (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of 
Georgia)  
2002  Anthem – Trigon (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Virginia) 
WellPoint – RightCHOICE (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Missouri 
and HealthLink) 
WellPoint – Methodist Care (Texas HMO)  
2003  WellPoint – Cobalt (Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Wisconsin)  
2004  Anthem – WellPoint Health Networks Inc. 
United – Oxford 
United – MAMSI  
 
 289. AHA WHITE PAPER, supra note 15, at 6. 
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2005  WellPoint – Lumenos 
United – PacifiCare 
HCSC – Blue Cross HIP – GHI  
2006  United – John Deere  
2007–
2008  United – Sierra 
Independence Blue Cross – Highmark (abandoned 2009) 
 
 
